Paolo, Servita [Pietro Sarpi]
[Appendix]
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THE MAXIMS OF GOVERNMENT

By which the ſeveral Intereſts of the PRINCES of EUROPE are managed.

By Father PAUL, the Servite Monk, and Counſellor of State to the Republick of VENICE.

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THE PREFACE.

THE following Treatiſe is no leſs ſingular for its Subject, than famous for its Author. We ſeldom find Perſons employed by Publick Authority, to enquire into the Defects and Inconveniences of the Conſtitution of a Government, and to conſider of proper ways how to amend them; to examine into the Intereſts which a State has with its neighbouring Princes, and to lay down Rules to be obſerv'd in all Treaties with them. However, this is what the Republick of *Venice* has, in former times, thought fit to do, they having for this end addreſs'd themſelves to their great Oracle of Wiſdom and Prudence, the renowned Father *Paul*; a Perſon eminent in the Republick of Learning for his many excellent Writings, but more particularly known here in *England*

by his famous Hiſtory of the Council of *Trent*.

He was a Man univerſally learn'd in all the Sciences, both Sacred and Prophane; but moſt excellently well vers'd in Hiſtory, and the Canon Law. He was in ſo great Eſteem in his own Country for his vaſt Learning and Judgment, that the Republick of *Venice* pitched upon him, as the fitteſt Perſon within their Dominions, to manage the great Controverſy they had, about a hundred Years ago, with Pope *Paul* the Vth, who had put the whole Republick under Sentence of Excommunication. It was upon this occaſion, that Father *Paul* was taken into the Service of the Republick, and made one of their Counſellors of State. He managed the Intereſt of the Republick againſt the Court of *Rome*, with ſuch Strength of Reaſon and Argument, that altho' the learned'ſt Pens of the Age were ſet to work againſt him, yet they were never able to confute his Writings. So that the Adverſaries of the Republick finding that this Method of anſwering the Father proved altogether unſucceſsful, they reſolved to change their Batteries, and to employ other Weapons for ſtopping his Mouth.

And

And accordingly, ſoon after the firſt Heats about this Affair began to riſe to a greater height, the Inquiſitors of State received Intelligence from their Spies, that there was a Deſign laid againſt Father *Paul*'s Life, upon which they gave him a Caution to be upon his Guard. But the Father, truſting to his own Innocence, and thinking himſelf in no manner of Danger, continued to walk the Streets with his uſual Freedom. However, one Evening as he was returning to his Convent, he was aſſaulted in the Streets by five Aſſaſſins, who gave him three Wounds with Stilettoes. The Republick was ſo concern'd at the loſs they were like to ſuſtain by Father *Paul's* Death, that the Senate order'd all the moſt eminent Phyſitians about *Venice* to attend him in his Cure. And he having, by their Aſſiſtance, recover'd of his Wounds, the Senate, to prevent any ſuch Danger to the Father's Life for the future, appointed him a Guard for his Perſon, and a Houſe near the Palace of St. *Mark*, where he might remain in Safety. But the Father being unwilling to change his courſe of Life, intreated that he might be allowed to continue in the Monaſtery among his Brethren, with whom he had lived ſo

comfortably until that time. The Senate seeing the Father so earnest to continue in his Monastick Life, granted him his Request. But for the Security of his Person, they caused some little Additions to be made to his Lodgings in the Convent, that by the means of a little Gallery, and a Ladder, he might have the Conveniency of taking Boat at his own Chambers; and that when it happen'd that he was to return from the Publick Service late at Night, he might pass directly out of his *Gondola* into his own Apartment, without crossing the Streets, or being seen by any Person.

After this Accident happen'd to Father *Paul*, he continu'd to serve the Republick in the Office of Counsellor of State for the space of sixteen Years, during which time nothing was transacted in the State, without being first imparted to him. And the Father's Judgment of things was in so great Esteem, that there seldom happen'd any Matter of Consequence in all the Cities under the Jurisdiction of the Republick, wherein he was not consulted; as in Testaments, Marriages, Successions, Feoffments, and even in Points of Honour. In all which Matters Father *Paul*'s

Answers

Anſwer's were always regarded as Oracles.

The Republick was ſo fully ſatisfied of the Father's Fidelity to the Intereſt of his Country, and ſo ſenſible of the Advantages which the Publick reap'd from his Labours, that they honour'd him with a Privilege, which was never granted to any other Counſellor of State, and which but a very few even of the Nobles themſelves enjoy. The Senate order'd him to have free Acceſs to the Archives of the Republick, which is undoubtedly the greateſt Treaſure of Political Maxims and Inſtructions that is any where extant in the World. For here are depoſited the Fundamental Laws of the Republick, the Maxims of State by which it is govern'd, all its Treaties of War and Peace, all its Alliances with Princes, and the Reports which all their Ambaſſadors make, at their Return from their Embaſſies, of the preſent Poſture of Affairs in the ſeveral Kingdoms where they have reſided.

Father *Paul* having got free Admittance to the Publick Archives, he, by his aſſiduous Application, and with the Advantages of a clear and ſolid Judgment, of a deep Penetration of

Mind, and of a moſt prodigious Memory, ſoon laid up a conſiderable Stock of Political Learning. And it appearing in his daily Conſultations upon the Publick Affairs, that he was throughly well acquainted with every thing relating to the Government and Intereſt of the Republick; the Inquiſitors of State deſired him to draw up in Writing his Opinion, as to the Meaſures which the Republick ought to follow, both in its Foreign and Domeſtick Concerns, in order to make its Dominion perpetual. The Advice which the Father drew up, in obedience to the Commands of his Superiors, is what I here preſent to the Reader. It was received by the Senate of *Venice* with great Applauſe, and carefully depoſited in their Archives. If we look into the Hiſtory of their Government, we ſhall find that the *Venetians* have all along cloſely purſued the Meaſures which the Father here recommends to them. And even at this Day, they ſtill have recourſe to this Advice, as to their Oracle of State.

This Treatiſe for a long time lay hid in the Archives of the Republick, the Senators not being willing it ſhould come into the Hands of any other Perſons, beſides

thoſe who have the chief Management of the Publick Affairs. But in proceſs of time, Copies of it began to creep abroad in Manuſcript, and at laſt it was privately printed ſome Years ago. However, the Book is ſtill rare to be met with, and has fallen into the Hands but of a few Perſons. The Sieur *Amelot de la Houſſaie*, who made a diligent Search after all the Books that treat of the Government of *Venice*, and who has tranſlated into *French* ſeveral Treatiſes of Father *Paul*, did never light upon this Diſcourſe, which would have been of ſingular Uſe to him in his Deſign. It would have given him a great inſight into the Government and Intereſt of that Republick; and would have ſet him right as to ſome Miſtakes he is fallen into, in the Account he gives of the Intereſt of that Republick with other Princes.

For when he comes to ſpeak of the Intereſt of the Republick with the Pope, he tells us, that the *Venetians* have it for a Maxim, not to keep any Penſioners at the Court of *Rome*, nor to concern themſelves in the Election of a Pope; that they content themſelves with holding a fair general Correſpondence with the Popes, by ſending them magnificent Embaſſies, and

receiving their Nephews into the number of their Nobles. He adds, that the Popes, to requite this Civility, always include the *Venetians* when they make a Promotion of Cardinals for the Crowns; but that the Senate does not care to name their Subjects whom they desire to have advanced to the Cardinalship, for fear of creating Jealousies among the Noble Families. 'Tis true, the Pope seldom makes a Promotion of Cardinals for the Crowns, but some *Venetian* Subject is of the number. However, this is not paying the same respect to the Republick, which the Popes pay to the Crown'd Heads. For when the Pope makes a Promotion of Cardinals in favour of the Crowns, he gives the Cap to the Subject whom the King names; but when he makes a *Venetian* Cardinal, the Pope himself chuses the Person, without any regard to the Recommendation of the Republick. And it is for this reason, that the *Venetian* Cardinals have no Dependence on the Senate, as the Cardinals of other Nations have on their Sovereigns, who procured them the Cardinal's Cap. It is upon this account, that the Republick of *Venice* has no Faction in the Conclave, as the Emperor, and the Kings of

France

France and *Spain* have. The *Venetian* Cardinals, as ſoon as they are promoted, liſt themſelves either into the Faction of the Pope who created them, or into ſome other Faction, according as their Intereſt or Inclination leads them. They are ſo far from having any Dependence on the Senate of *Venice*, that the Ambaſſadors of the Republick complain, that the Cardinals of their own Nation are the moſt violent Oppoſers of every thing that is for the Grandeur, or Intereſt of the Republick.

This is the true reaſon, why the Republick of *Venice* has ſo few Penſioners at the Court of *Rome*; becauſe all their Eccleſiaſtical Subjects expect their Advancement to the Honours and Dignities of the Church from the Favours and Good-will of the Pope alone, and not from the Protection of the Senate. This is the real Cauſe, why the Republick does not meddle in the Election of a Pope; becauſe it has not the Votes of the *Venetian* Cardinals at its Command, as other Sovereign Princes have thoſe of their own Subjects. But the Republick is ſo far from acting with this Indifferency upon Reaſons of State, as the *Sieur Amelot* ſays, that they complain of this undutiful Beha-

Behaviour of their own Subjects, as one of the greateſt Grievances they have at the Court of *Rome*. And the Senate gives ſtrict Injunctions to all the Ambaſſadors of the Republick, to try to get this Abuſe remedied, by gaining over all the *Venetian* Cardinals, and Prelates, to an abſolute Dependence on the Senate [a].

There is no State has greater reaſon to concern it ſelf in the Election of a Pope than the Republick of *Venice*, becauſe of the many Differences it has to adjuſt with the Court of *Rome*, on account of the Confines of their Territories, and other common Concerns. Father *Paul*, in this Treatiſe, adviſes them to uſe all poſſible Endeavours to procure the Election of a Pope that is well inclined to the Republick, that they may be able to obtain of him all the Prerogatives and Privileges which are granted to Crown'd Heads; ſuch as the having always a Cardinal's Cap for one of their Subjects, whenever the Subjects of other Princes are promoted to that Dignity; the getting the Nuncios

[a] For a fuller Information of all theſe Matters, the Reader may be pleas'd to conſult the Lives of the *Venetian* Cardinals, in the Preſent State of *Rome*, printed in the Year 1706.

reſiding

reſiding at *Venice* to be advanced directly from their Nunciature to the Cardinalſhip; and ſome other Demands which they inſiſt on, to preſerve the equality of Rank they claim among Kings. Whoever has had an Opportunity of peruſing any of the Reports which the *Venetian* Ambaſſadors to the Court of *Rome* have given into the Senate, at their Return from their Embaſſies, would there ſee with what Zeal and Fervour they all labour to obtain thoſe Privileges from the Popes, which Father *Paul* here recommends to them ſo earneſtly to inſiſt upon. And his Excellency *Signor Nicolo Erizzo*, one of the Ambaſſadors Extraordinary from the Republick to her preſent Majeſty of *Great Britain*, in the Report which he gave in to the Senate about three Years ago, at his return from the Court of *Rome*, ſhews of what great advantage it would be to the Republick, if the Popes could be prevail'd with, when they make a Promotion of Cardinals for the Crowns, to allow the Senate to name their own Subject, whom they deſire to have advanced to the Cardinalſhip, as Kings do theirs. And in caſe this cannot be obtain'd, he adviſes the Senate to inſiſt on getting at leaſt a liberty to name four Subjects,

out

out of which the Pope may chuſe one to be made a Cardinal, as is practis'd in the choice of the *Venetian* Auditor of the *Ruota*.

This Diſcourſe of Father P*aul*'s contains a great many remarkable things concerning the Conſtitution, it lays down Maxims to be obſerved in the Government of its Subjects, and conſiders at large the Intereſt of the Republick, not only with the Princes of *Italy*, but with all foreign Potentates. The Tranſactions of that Commonwealth are kept ſo ſecret, and every thing they deſign is hid under ſo many falſe Pretexts and Appearances, that it is almoſt impoſſible to know their true Intentions. I look upon this Treatiſe therefore to be the more valuable, becauſe it helps us to diſcover the true Springs of all their Counſels, let them be hid under never ſo thick a Cloud of Appearances. It gives us at the ſame time, a clear and diſtinct View of the ſeveral Intereſts of all the Princes of *Italy*, and lets us ſee what are the likelieſt Motives to prevail with them to engage in a War, or to obſerve an exact Neutrality. For this reaſon, I thought it truly a Loſs to the Publick, that ſuch an uſeful Treatiſe as this ſhould lie hid during the preſent War in *Italy*,

ly, in which ſeveral of the Princes of that Country are actually engaged, and others have been earneſtly ſollicited by both Parties to declare themſelves. I was therefore induced to tranſlate it into the Language of a Nation, which is ſo greatly intereſſed in the preſent War, and which has in her hands the Ballance of *Europe*, and may turn the Scales which way ſhe pleaſes.

In my Tranſlation I have kept cloſe to the Original, and have made no other Alterations in the Book, than by dividing it into Chapters and Paragraphs, which, I think, will make it more agreeable to the Reader. There are ſome things mention'd in this Treatiſe, relating to the Councils, Magiſtrates, and Courts of Judicature in *Venice*, which every Reader will not readily underſtand, unleſs he is ſomewhat vers'd in the Hiſtorians that treat of the Conſtitution and Government of that Republick. I have therefore thought fit, for the conveniency of ſuch Perſons as have not had an opportunity of being much converſant in thoſe matters, to ſet down ſome Marginal Notes, for the explanation of ſuch things as may not perhaps be obvious to every Reader. Whoever is deſirous to be more fully informed

informed of the Government of that Republick, may have recourſe to the Sieur *Amelot*'s Hiſtory of the Government of *Venice*; who has made a very compleat Collection of all thoſe matters out of the *Venetian* Hiſtorians. Or if there are any Perſons who are more curious than to take things at ſecond Hand, and deſire to have them from the Fountain Head, let them conſult *Donato Gianotti* in his Book *della Republica d'Venetiani.*

The Knowledge of the Hiſtory, Government, and Intereſts of foreign Nations, is, in my opinion, one of the beſt Accompliſhments for qualifying a Gentleman to ſerve his own Country. To get an exact Information of theſe things, is the great and main End of travelling into foreign Countries. Moſt Travellers, who are come to Years of Judgment and Diſcretion, and who ſeek more after Improvement than Pleaſure in their Travels, are wont to remark in foreign Parts, what they think deſerves moſt their Attention, or what they judge may be profitable or delightful to their Fellow-Subjects. Some obſerve the publick and private Edifices, others the Remains of Antiquity, and others again the Laws and Government, the Commerce and natural Products of the

the Countries thro' which they paſs. We find the Antients were always diligent Enquirers into the Laws and Governments of other Countries, by which they learn'd to correct what was amiſs in their own Conſtitution, and to avoid the Inconveniences which they ſaw others liable to. The *Romans*, when they laid the firſt Foundations of their Commonwealth, ſent Perſons into *Greece* to collect all the moſt uſeful Laws and Cuſtoms that were to be found among the *Grecian* Republicks. And theſe were the firſt Beginnings of that excellent Body of the *Roman* Laws, which is ſtill at this day almoſt univerſally received as the true Standard of Equity and Reaſon for deciding all Cauſes. *Ariſtotle* was ſo ſenſible of the great Uſefulneſs of this ſort of Knowledge, that he compos'd particular Books of the Cuſtoms and Governments of all the Commonwealths that were extant in his time, and came within the reach of his Knowledge.

The Frame and Government of the Republick of *Venice* is thought to be no leſs worthy of the Curioſity of our Times, than the Commonwealths of *Rome* and *Lacedæmon* were of the Attention of former Ages. Altho' this Republick has been declining for ſome time

time paſt, yet it is ſtill conſiderable for its Majeſty, Antiquity, and the Form of its Government, which is celebrated as a Maſter-piece in Politicks. This Republick has gather'd together all the Political Maxims that were in vogue among the *Grecian* Commonwealths, and it ſeems to have pick'd out the Commonwealth of *Lacedæmon* for the Pattern which it delights moſt to imitate in its Civil Adminiſtration. But the Republick of *Venice* has this Advantage over all the antient Republicks, that it has preſerv'd itſelf longer than any of the moſt powerful Commonwealths in former Ages. The Commonwealth of *Lacedæmon* did not laſt above ſeven hundred Years; and the famous Commonwealth of *Rome*, the Queen of the World, was hardly able to maintain her Liberty full five hundred Years; whereas it is near thirteen hundred Years ſince the Commonwealth of *Venice* had its firſt beginning.

'Tis true, that, ſince its firſt Foundation, it has undergone ſeveral Changes in the Form of its Government. The Republick was at firſt a perfect Democracy, while it continued under the Government of its Conſuls and Tribunes. Afterwards it changed into a Monarchy, when the People

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choſe their Doges with an abſolute and unlimited Power. Then, after ſome hundreds of Years, the People began to be weary of this Adminiſtration, and reaſſumed the Power into their own hands. However, they thought fit ſtill to elect a Prince, to give the greater credit to all their Publick Affairs; but they limited and reſtrained his Power in ſuch a manner, that they left him nothing beſides the empty Title, and the Precedency; the Great Council, which conſiſted of about four hundred and ſeventy Citizens, choſen out of the Body of the People, having taken into its hands the Management of all the publick Concerns. *Venice* continued in this State of *Democracy* till the Year 1297, when the Doge *Pietro Gradenigo* procured the Government of the Republick to be model'd into the Form in which we ſee it at preſent. A Law was then enacted, bearing that all thoſe who were Members of the Great Council that Year, or had ſat in it any time within the four preceding Years, they and their Poſterity ſhould always be Members of the Great Council, without any new Election; and that all others of what Quality ſoever, whether Nobles or Plebeians, (thoſe were called Nobles,

who were deſcended of the antient Tribunes) ſhould be for ever excluded from having any ſhare in the Government. By this Law, the Sovereign Power was taken from the People, and put into the hands of a certain number of Families. And the Republick has continued under this Ariſtocratical Form of Government, for above four hundred Years. The Republick of *Venice*, notwithſtanding all theſe Changes in the Form of its Government, and the Submiſſions it has been obliged to make to the Emperors for their Protection, has ſtill maintain'd itſelf a free Sovereign State, having never been conquer'd by any foreign Power, nor brought into ſubjection by any of its own Citizens. And this long duration of the Republick can be aſcribed to nothing elſe, but to the Wiſdom and Prudence of its Councils, which appear indeed to be wonderful in all the Parts of the Conſtitution.

If we look into the Method which the *Venetians* uſe in electing their Magiſtrates, we ſhall there diſcover a moſt wonderful Care and Vigilance to avoid Corruption and Bribery in Elections, to prevent Party and Faction among the Nobles. The Candidates in Elections, whatever ſecret Sollicitations

tations they may uſe among their Friends on the *Broglio* *, yet they are not ſeen to go publickly about from Houſe to Houſe, begging a Vote, as if it were an Alms. They do not ſend their Emiſſaries abroad to proclaim aloud in the Ears of the People, that their Competitors are *Rogues*, and *Villains*, and *Traitors* to their Country. If ſuch infamous Practices as theſe were in the leaſt connived at in *Venice*, their City would be daily filled with Murders, and their Republick ſoon tore in pieces by Feuds and Diſſenſions among the Nobles. To prevent therefore the fatal Conſequences of ſuch immoral and unchriſtian Practices in Popular Elections, the *Venetians* have made ſevere Laws againſt all manner of canvaſſing or making intereſt for Places. And beſides, they have ſo contrived the way and manner of their Elections, that they have made it almoſt impoſſible for the Electors to form themſelves into Parties for any Candidate whatſoever, becauſe of the uncertainty to whoſe lot it will fall to be Candidates for the Place. The Votes are likewiſe collected with ſo much ſecrecy, that it is impoſſible for one Man to know how another has voted. And this

* *A publick Place near St.* Mark's *Palace, where the Nobles walk.*

Secrecy in voting cuts off a great many Occaſions of Grudges and Animoſities among the Nobles, which would otherwiſe happen, if it were known how every one voted in Elections.

The Laws of the Republick not only reſtrain the canvaſſing for Places, but likewiſe forbid all Compliments of Congratulation to Perſons that are elected into Offices. The Occaſion of this Law, was an antient Cuſtom among the Nobles, that when any of them were choſen into a new Office, as ſoon as the Election was over, they went and poſted themſelves in a convenient Place, where they might be ſeen by all the Nobles as they came out of the Great Council. And every one went to wiſh the new Magiſtrate joy of his Office, making ſolemn Proteſtations that he had befriended him in his Election, altho' perhaps he had given his Vote againſt him. Theſe Compliments were ſo full of Diſingenuity, and accompanied with ſo much ſordid and fulſom Flattery, fitter to proceed from the Mouths of the cringing Multitude, than to be utter'd by grave Senators, that the *Cenſors* drew up a Law for aboliſhing them intirely; which Law was paſs'd in the Senate,

and

and ratified in the Great Council, with a general Applauſe.

The Election of Magiſtrates is chiefly committed to the Great Council, which is the Baſe and Foundation of the Government of the Republick, it being compoſed of all the Nobles that are paſt five and twenty Years of Age. But this Council is too numerous an Aſſembly to conſult about matters that require a ſerious Deliberation. And therefore all Affairs of great importance are reſerved to the Senate, where Matters are tranſacted with greater maturity of deliberation, and in a leſs tumultuary manner, than in the Great Council. There are likewiſe ſome Offices of the greateſt Truſt which are reſerv'd to the Senate to diſpoſe of; ſuch as the chief Command of the Forces by Sea or Land. It is the Senate that names all the *Sages** of the Republick, who are as it were the prime Miniſters of State, they having the chief direction and management of all the publick Affairs. The Ambaſſadors to foreign Courts are named by the Senate. It is the Senate alone that has power to deliberate about Peace and War, to conclude Truces and Alliances, to appoint Ways and Means for raiſing

* *Savil.*

of Money, and to enact new Laws. 'Tis true, the Council of Ten has a vaſt Authority to treat of Peace and War, and to enter into Alliances with Princes; without the participation of the Senate. But it ſeldom makes uſe of this Power, except in extraordinary caſes, where the Safety of the Commonwealth depends on a quick diſpatch of Buſineſs, and a great Secrecy in Counſels.

The *Venetians* ſhew no leſs Prudence in the choice of their Magiſtrates, than in the manner of electing them. They do not admit their Nobles to Offices of Truſt, till they are pretty well advanced in Years, and have attain'd to a competent Knowledge in State Affairs. The Nobles do not enter into the Great Council before they are full five and twenty Years old, and they are not capable of being choſen into the Senate till they are paſt thirty. They mount gradually from a lower degree of Truſt to a higher; and are not admitted to the greateſt Poſts in the Republick, till they have acquir'd a great Stock of Experience in Matters of Government, and have given ſufficient Proofs of their Conduct and Integrity in Poſts of a leſſer importance. And that the Nobles may the more

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eaſily attain to a thorough Knowledge of the Publick Affairs, before they come to have the Management and Direction of them, it is very wiſely order'd by the Republick, that a great many Nobles ſhall, by virtue of their Offices, be entitled to aſſiſt in the Senate, and to be preſent at all its Deliberations, without having a Right to vote in any thing that is laid before them. The Deſign of this is to train up the young Nobility in the Art of Government, to let them in to the Knowledge of the Affairs of State, before they come to ſit at the Helm, and govern the Republick. This prevents a great Inconvenience, which otherwiſe would be unavoidable, by the frequent change of the Senators, and other Magiſtrates, if they were ſucceeded in their Offices by Perſons who are altogether unacquainted with the publick Tranſactions. But this Method ſupplies the Republick with a conſtant and uninterrupted Succeſſion of able Stateſmen. When one Officer of State is removed, he is ſucceeded by another, who, if he has not already ſerv'd in the ſame Poſt, yet is no Novice in the Affairs of State, he having aſſiſted ſeveral Years perhaps at all the Deliberations of the Senate.

So that he is thoroughly vers'd in the Intereſts and Maxims of the Republick, and will, in all likelihood, purſue the ſame Meaſures that were carried on by his Predeceſſor.

What a vaſt difference muſt there needs be, between a new Miniſtry of this ſort, where the Miniſters are thus prepared by a previous Knowledge of every thing relating to the Intereſt of their Country, before they are admitted to govern it; and a new Miniſtry, where the Miniſters perhaps have never extended their thoughts beyond the Concerns of their private Families, have never ſtudied the Maxims of their own Government, nor inquired into the Intereſts of other Princes. Wherever ſuch Men are admitted into the Miniſtry, who are perfect Novices in all Political Affairs, let them be Men of never ſo great Integrity, of never ſo prodigious natural Parts, yet the Commonwealth will always be in hazard of ſuffering by their Management, till they have acquir'd ſome Years Experience. It muſt certainly therefore be a great Happineſs in a Conſtitution, to provide that Subjects be train'd up in the Knowledge of the Intereſt, and publick Concerns of

their

their Country; that whenever Miniſters of State are rendred unfit for Service thro' Old Age or Infirmity, there may be always ready at hand a conſtant Supply of able Perſons, who are well grounded in Political Learning, and who are thoroughly acquainted with the thread of all the publick Tranſactions.

It is likewiſe a thing highly worthy our Obſervation, the great Care and Application of the Senate of *Venice*, to preſerve a perfect Harmony and Concord between all the Councils of the Republick, to cultivate a good Correſpondence among all thoſe that have any ſhare in the Publick Government. This Republick is far from following that State Maxim, *Divide & Impera*, in the miſtaken Senſe of it, which is ſo much in vogue in ſome Countries, of keeping up Factions and Parties among thoſe who have the Adminiſtration of the Publick Affairs. They are ſenſible, that there is nothing more dangerous to the Liberty of all Commonwealths, than Jealouſies and Miſunderſtandings among thoſe who ſit at the Helm of Affairs, the Party that is undermoſt thirſting always after Changes and Innovations. The *Venetians* know well

well enough, that the Ruin of all Commonwealths has proceeded from the Diviſions among their principal Citizens. They are aware, how moſt of the other Republicks in *Italy* have, by their inteſtine Quarrels, diſpeopled their own Cities, and drove out the Inhabitants, according as the different Parties and Factions did prevail. They have ſeen the fatal Effects of the Diviſions between the *Bianchi* and *Neri* in *Florence*. They know what Convulſions and Revolutions the Parties of the *Guelfs* and *Ghibbelines* have occaſioned in all the States of *Italy*. Neither are they ignorant of the woful Calamities this Iſland has formerly been expos'd to, by Factions and Diviſions among the Subjects; how thoſe inteſtine Commotions ended in the Murder of the King, and Subverſion of the Government both in Church and State.

The *Venetians* therefore, having learn'd to be wiſe at the expence of other Nations, take particular care to cultivate a perfect Union among their Nobles, and to ſuppreſs immediately all Feuds and Quarrels that happen among them. As ſoon as any Quarrel ariſes, the Senate, or Council of Ten, immediately iſſues out Orders

to

to both Parties to make up the breach without delay; and their Orders are ſure to meet with a punctual and ready Compliance, becauſe of the certainty of the Puniſhment that will fall ſoon and heavily on the Heads of the Diſobedient. All Factions naturally tend to the Deſtruction of the Perſons concern'd in them. And therefore we ſee that the *Venetians*, when they have a mind to cruſh and keep under any part of their Subjects, whom they ſuſpect to be any way inclinable to rebel againſt the State, the Method they take, is to foment Factions and Diviſions among them. And this is the very Method which Father *Paul*, in this Diſcourſe, adviſes them to take with thoſe Subjects whoſe Fidelity they cannot ſafely rely on. It is with this View, that the Republick encourages Feuds and Animoſities among the Nobility of their conquer'd Provinces, that, being ruin'd by their own Diviſions, they may not be in a condition to ſhake off the Yoke of their Conquerors. It is likewiſe upon this account, that Parties and Factions are induſtriouſly kept on foot among the Citizens of *Venice*, that while they are thus divided among themſelves, they may

may never be able to unite in a Revolt againſt their Superiours. And however Perſons may urge, that the entertaining of Parties and Factions tends to preſerve the Liberty of the Subject, the different Parties being Checks upon one another; yet it is moſt certain, that the Experience of paſt Ages ſhews us, that Parties and Factions in a State have always ended in the Ruin and Subverſion of the Conſtitution. And wherever Parties have come to any height, either in an Ariſtocratical Government, or in a Limited Monarchy, they have never fail'd at laſt to terminate, either in an Abſolute Tyranny, or in a Popular Democracy. A Nation that has a mind to preſerve its preſent Conſtitution of Government, can never be able to do it, without entertaining a perfect Union and Harmony among its Members. And when a People grow weary of their antient Conſtitution, they cannot fall upon a more effectual way to deſtroy it, than by ſetting up Parties and Factions in the State.

Among many other excellent things which are to be met with in the Government of the Republick of *Venice*, I think their manner of enacting new Laws is worthy of Remark. When any

any new Law is to receive the publick Sanction, it is firſt drawn up into a Form by the Judges, or Magiſtrates, to whoſe Juriſdiction the ſubject matter of the new Law does belong. If the Law that is to be made, concerns the Puniſhment of any Crime, the Judges of the Criminal Court draw up the Form of the Law. If it has reſpect to the Adminiſtration of Civil Juſtice, the Draught of the Law is made by the Civil Judges. If it is propos'd to remedy any Extravagance in the Equipage, Apparel, or Diet, of the Nobles, or Subjects, of the Republick; the framing of the new Law is recommended to the Magiſtrates who are entruſted with putting the Sumptuary Laws in execution. If the Deſign of the Law is to cruſh all Cabals and Parties among the Nobles, to prevent their ſoliciting and making intereſt for Places of Truſt, the new Law is pen'd by the Cenſors, whoſe Office it is to have a watchful eye over the Conduct of the Nobles.

When the new Law is once fram'd and drawn up by the proper Magiſtrates, they carry it firſt into the *College*, which is as it were the Privy Council of the Republick, it being compos'd

compos'd of the Doge, and his ſix Counſellors, of the three Preſidents of the Criminal Court, and of the ſixteen *Sages*, or Miniſters of State, of the Republick. There the Magiſtrates who have drawn up the Law, lay open the Inconveniences and Defects of former Laws relating to that Affair, and ſhew the Neceſſity, or Uſefulneſs, of the new Law, to prevent, for the future, the Abuſes that are complain'd of. If the Draught of the Law is approv'd of in the College, then the Magiſtrates who drew it up have Leave to lay it before the Senate, and to ſatisfy the Senators of the Neceſſity, or Uſefulneſs, of the ſaid Law. If it paſſes in the Senate, it acquires the Force of a Law. After which it is promulged to the People, that none may pretend Ignorance; and then every one is bound to obſerve it, and the Magiſtrates who had the drawing of it up, are to ſee it punctually obey'd. Sometimes after a Law has paſt in the Senate, it is thought fit to have it likewiſe ratified in the Great Council; but this is not neceſſary according to the Conſtitution of the Government of the Republick, the Senate being veſted with the Supreme Legiſlative

giſlative Power. However, this depends chiefly on the Will and Pleaſure of the Magiſtrates who have the care of framing the new Law; and they ſometimes are induced to lay it before the Great Council, that the new Law may have the greater Credit and Reputation among the People. This Method of enacting Laws, methinks, is ſuitable to the Wiſdom and Prudence that is requir'd in Lawgivers. Here the Laws are not huddled up in the hurry of Publick Affairs; the care of drawing them up is not committed to Perſons, who are altogether unacquainted with the ſubject matter of the new Law, or whoſe Thoughts are diſtracted with all the other publick Concerns of the Commonwealth. The Laws of this Republick are maturely weigh'd and conſider'd before they are laid before the Senate; and they are fram'd by Perſons whoſe Buſineſs it is to be daily converſant in thoſe matters to which the new Law relates; by Perſons who are moſt ſenſible of the Abuſes complain'd of, and who beſt know the proper ways to remedy them. When Laws are drawn up with this maturity of Counſel and Deliberation, when

when they are examin'd with this foreſight and precaution before they receive the Publick Sanction; this is a moſt effectual Expedient to prevent all Inconveniences from new Laws, and it is the only way to make the Laws of a State durable and laſting.

As the *Venetians* ſhew a great deal of Prudence, in the framing of Laws for the Government of their Subjects; ſo they are no leſs careful in getting an exact Information of the Laws and Government of other Countries, and of the Intereſts of all the other States of Chriſtendom. They oblige their Ambaſſadors, when they return from their Embaſſies, to give in to the Senate, in writing, a Report of their Embaſſies, containing an Account of the preſent State of the Courts where they have reſided, with a Character of the ſeveral Princes, and of their chief Miniſters of State, the Maxims of their Government, the Intereſt they have to manage with other Princes, and more particularly the Advantages which the Republick may reap by a good Correſpondence with thoſe Princes, and the Methods by which they may be moſt readily influenced to a Com-

plyance

plyance with the Intereſt of their Commonwealth. Theſe Reports, after they have been publickly read in the Senate, are carefully laid up in the Archives of the Republick, that they may afterwards ſerve as Inſtructions to the other Nobles that are ſent Ambaſſadors to thoſe Courts. As the Ambaſſadors of the Republick have all manner of Advantages to qualify themſelves for ſerving their Country, before they are ſent to foreign Courts; ſo there is likewiſe great care taken to train up fit Perſons to ſerve as Secretaries to the Embaſſies. For before they are ſent abroad, they are made acquainted with all the Tranſactions of the Senate, which gives them ſuch an inſight into Affairs of State, and ſuch a Knowledge of the Intereſts of their own Country, that it fits them for making Political Obſervations in foreign Parts, and for aſſiſting the Ambaſſadors in the management of the Concerns of the Republick.

I might inſtance in a great many more Particulars, to ſhew the Wiſdom and Prudence of the Government of *Venice*. But ſhould I here inſiſt any longer on theſe matters, I ſhould

tranſgreſs the uſual bounds of a Preface. I ſhall therefore conclude what I have to ſay on this Subject at preſent, with one Remark more. And that is, that altho' the Republick of *Venice* has many excellent Maxims in its Government, worthy of being imitated by other States; yet whoever looks narrowly into its Conſtitution, will find likewiſe many Defects and Failings in it. They will ſee by the Hiſtory of this Republick, as well as of all other Commonwealths, whether Ariſtocratical or Democratical, that Arbitrary and Deſpotical Government is not peculiar to Monarchy, as ſome would have it. There is no Form of Government whatever, except a Theocracy, that is altogether perfect in every thing; the only difference between all other Forms of Government conſiſts in this, that ſome of them are attended with fewer Inconveniencies than others. And ſince it is impoſſible to have any Human Form of Government abſolutely perfect; we muſt look upon that to be the happieſt and beſt Conſtitution, that is liable to feweſt Inconveniencies. And I dare be bold to ſay, that

what-

whatever Native of this Iſland travels into Foreign Countries, and makes a diligent Enquiry into the Hiſtory and Government of other States, will ſoon be convinced, that the Monarchy of *Great Britain* is the mildeſt and gentleſt Government in the World; ſince the Conſtiution ſecures the Subjects equally againſt the Arbitrary and Deſpotical Power of Princes, againſt the Tyranny and Oppreſſion of the Nobles, and againſt the Confuſion and Diſorder of the Populace. If any People upon Earth can be eaſy and contented in a State of Subjection to Lawful Superiors, the *Britiſh* Subjects have moſt reaſon ſo to be; ſince they live under ſuch an excellent and well-temper'd Conſtitution of Government, that every Man may ſit ſecurely under his own Fig-tree, and peaceably enjoy the Fruit of his Labours. And to make us continue a happy People for ever, I think there is nothing wanting, but the joint Endeavours of all the Subjects, to maintain and preſerve our Conſtitution ſacred and inviolable in all its Parts, to be at

Peace and Unity among our ſelves, to baniſh all Parties and Factions, and to take ſpecial care, that the Liberty which the Subject happily enjoys, does not degenerate into a licentious Impunity of Railing againſt God and Man.

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Father *PAUL's* ADVICE TO THE Republick of VENICE:

How it ought to govern it ſelf both inwardly and outwardly, in order to perpetuate its Dominion, *&c.*

Moſt Illuſtrious, and moſt Noble Lords, Inquiſitors of State[a].

I. *The Introduction.*

IT is purely in obedience to your Commands that I write this, without reflecting on my own Unfitneſs for ſuch a Work, becauſe I think the chief Conſideration I ought to have,

[a] The Inquiſitors of State are three Noblemen choſen out of the Council of Ten, who are entruſted with ſuch an abſolute and unlimited Power, that they may condemn the Doge himſelf to be drowned, or ſtrangled, if they all three are of the ſame Mind: But if they are divided in their Opinions, they muſt communicate the matter to the Council of Ten. They have

is the Obedience I owe my Sovereign, to whom I owe all I have, and to whoſe Service I have entirely devoted my Labours. So that if the writing of theſe Papers can contribute any thing to the Service of my Prince, I ſhall not be wanting either in Willingneſs to promote it, or in Faithfulneſs to tell what I think moſt for his Intereſt.

II. *Heads of the Diſcourſe.*

Your Excellencies are pleas'd to command me, to give my Opinion as to the manner in which the Republick ought to be govern'd, ſo as that we may have ground to hope for its perpetual Duration. To lead us into the Knowledge of this, it will be neceſſary to divide our Diſcourſe into three Heads. *Firſt*, we ſhall ſet down ſome Rules to be obſerv'd in the Go-

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have their Spies in all the Corners of the City, and over all the Dominions of the Republick, to give them an account of the Words and Actions of all the Nobles, and Subjects. They go over the Palace of *St. Mark* at all Hours in the Night, where they enter and go out at private back Doors, to which they have a Key. They may go, if they pleaſe, even to the Doge's Bed-ſide, go into his Cloſet, make open his Scritore, and take an Inventory of all his Papers; and neither the Doge himſelf, nor any of his Domeſticks, dare ſeem to take notice of them.

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vernment of the City, together with the proper ways to be uſed for keeping the Nobility, and Subjects, within the Bounds of their Duty. In the *Second* place, we ſhall conſider the different Methods that are to be uſed in governing the ſeveral Territories belonging to the Republick. And *Thirdly*, we ſhall examine what Regards the Republick ought to have in its Treaties with other Princes.

CHAP. I.

Rules to be obſerv'd in the Government of the City, and the proper ways for keeping the Nobility, and Subjects, within the Bounds of their Duty.

IN ſpeaking to this point, I might apply the Saying of St. *Bernard* to the Doge *Moro*, which was, *That the Republick would laſt as long as the Cuſtom continued of doing Juſtice*; a Maxim no leſs politick than holy, becauſe under this ſhort Rubrick are contain'd ſo many good Advices, that were they all faithfully obſerv'd, we

1. *A Saying of St. Bernard's to this purpoſe.*

we might justly expect thereby to perpetuate the Dominion of the Commonwealth to all Ages. But to speak more conformably to the Condition of the Times, we must reduce under the Title of Justice, every thing that may contribute to the Service of the State; for the Prince has no greater Justice, than to preserve to himself the Quality of Prince, and in order to this, to keep his Subjects in a dutiful Subjection to his Authority. Some extend the meaning of Justice to every thing that may contribute to the enlargement of the State; but such an extension would be attended with such Accidents, as would rather destroy, than maintain the Quality of Justice. So that to keep within the Bounds of what is at least probable, if not wholly true, we shall continue in this Opinion, that Justice includes every thing that may contribute to the Preservation of the State.

II. *The Nobility to be taxed, as well as the Subjects.*

In the Government of the City, it is an excellent Custom to tax the Nobility, as well as the Subjects; because the Tax is the less burthensome, when it is universal; and it is the more just, when it is laid on without partiality. There is no doubt, but the making the Nobility subject to Taxes, lessens their Splendor; and in other Governments, the

the Noblemen, altho' they are not conſtituent parts of the Sovereignty, but either Subjects, or Vaſſals, are exempted from Taxes, and contribute to the Defence of the Publick, more with their Swords, than with their Purſes. However, ſince this Cuſtom has been born with for many Ages, and becauſe it is not convenient to encourage too much the Privileges of the Sword, it is better to let this Cuſtom go on, than to change it, becauſe ſuch a change would occaſion too great Reſentment among the common People, and too great Preſumption among the Nobles; I mean, thoſe that are ſuch by Character, but who have not the Qualities belonging to that Order, 'Tis true, when Taxes are perſonal, and admit of Favour, I ſhould adviſe the exempting every Nobleman that has the leaſt pretence to it. And when the Tax is laid upon *Eſtates* in ſuch a manner, that it becomes unavoidable, it would be convenient induſtriouſly to grant to the Noblemen the Benefit of Time; and even altho' after this Indulgence they ſhould ſtill continue backward in paying, yet it would not be proper to have recourſe to the Rigor of the Law, to force them to it. The reaſon why I adviſe theſe tender Methods to be uſed in levying Taxes on the Nobi-

lity, is, that Noblemens Eſtates may always be preſerv'd entire to the Families. For extreams are always dangerous, and the Commonwealth may ſuffer as much from too poor a Nobility, as from one that is too rich. Beſides, it raiſes too much of Envy, among a People, when any one ſees himſelf ſtrip'd, and his Companion clad with his Cloaths, becauſe he had not wherewithal to pay a Debt that was laid upon him by the Will of others.

III. *The having Governments with a ſmall Income, not ſo great an Abuſe as appears at firſt ſight.*

Thoſe who do not pry narrowly into the reaſons of things, exaggerate, as a great abuſe in this Republick, the having Governments of ſo ſmall an Income; that they force, as it were, the Magiſtrates, and Governours, to tranſgreſs the Rules of good Government, and, after having ſat as Judges of others, to ſubmit themſelves to Judgment, that they may juſtify, if they are able, their own Integrity. This is an Abuſe that is mightily talk'd of, and truly in appearance it is one; for it being a Duty to afford means of Living to thoſe that have it not, the putting Perſons into Governments that have ſuch a poor Revenue, puts them in the way, not to live, but to Plunder. However, I would not adviſe the augmenting the Profits of theſe Govern-

Governments, becauſe there ariſes from them another much greater Benefit to the Publick, which is the keeping the poorer Nobility always in a low condition, which is like to the Viper, that is not able in the Cold to uſe its Poiſon. For otherwiſe theſe Nobles, who are diſcontented in their Minds, could they but riſe to any tolerable degree of Fortune in the World, they would ſet up for Competitors to the Nobility of the firſt Rank; and, by the Strength of their Number, they would be able to play ſome mad prank in the State of the Republick. But now they are kept within the Bounds of their Duty, not only by the watchful Eye of the Nobility, who never fail to clip the Wings of thoſe that attempt to ſoar aloft, but likewiſe becauſe they are every other Day ſubject to the Cenſure of the prime Nobility, for their Miſdemeanors in their Government; ſo that holding of them their Lives, and that little Fortune which they enjoy, they are in reality Subjects, and have only the appearance of Nobles. I am clearly of opinion, that the ſearch into the Miſmanagements of their Government ought not to be very rigid, except when the Abuſes committed by them are ſo very exceſſive as to give Scandal to all the

Subjects; in which caſe it is neceſſary to declare an Abhorrence of the Crime by a publick Reſentment. But where the Grievances againſt them are not very crying, it is better to go on gently, and to let the Obligation they are under, to give an account of their Stewardſhip, ſuffice for their Puniſhment.

IV. *In what manner the Nobility ought to be puniſh'd.*

I ſhould think it were not very proper to condemn any of the Nobility, altho' never ſo criminal, to a publick Death; becauſe the Loſs which the Order of the Nobility ſuffers in the Eſteem, and Veneration of the Subjects, when any of them are ſeen to paſs thro' the Hands of a Hangman, is greater than the Benefit which is reap'd by a publick Shew of Juſtice. For never one pretends to be under an Obligation to the Perſon that does him Juſtice, becauſe he thinks him bound to do that of his own accord. But on the other hand, I ſhould not like to ſee thoſe Noblemen, that are ſo highly criminal, appear in the publick Places of the City; becauſe this would create a bad Opinion of the Government; ſo that it were better either to let them end their Days in a Priſon, or if it be neceſſary to puniſh them with Death, to do it privately. If the Abſence of

theſe Criminals make it neceſſary for the Government to proceed to Outlawry, and Baniſhment, let that be done with the utmoſt Severity; for then if no more is done againſt them, it is believ'd to be becauſe no more can be done. But there ought to be no leſs Rigour uſed in receiving them back again into the Republick; becauſe they being of themſelves rotten Members, cut off from the Body of the Society, it is not expedient to deform the Body, by patching to it anew thoſe corrupt and putrefied Members.

V. *No fear that any of the Nobility of* Venice *ever uſurp the Government of the State.*

Here I foreſee that ſome will be apt to accuſe me of being a bad Pilot, and that while I ſtrive to avoid *Charybdis*, I ſtrike againſt *Scylla*; that is, that while I endeavour to keep the inferior Nobility in a low condition, I do not foreſee the Danger there is from the greater Nobility; which yet ought to be of greater Conſideration, becauſe they are more powerful, both in Wealth and Alliances. I perceive the Objection, but it does not appear to me to be of any Weight; and this proceeds from the long Practice I have of this City, as to which I dare be bold to propheſy, that the Republick of *Venice* will never ſuffer that Fate which has been the end of all other Common-

Commonwealths; that is, that the Authority of many having been reduced into the Hands of a few Perſons, and from a few into the Hands of one, all Commonwealths have ended in a Monarchy. The Emulation that is, not only between the Nobles of the firſt Rank, and thoſe who aſpire at being greater, but likewiſe between the Noblemen of one and the ſame Family, nay even between Brothers, ſecures us from this Danger. And if ever it ſhould fall out, which is utterly impoſſible, that the Brothers of one Family ſhould have it in their power to make a Dictator of the Commonwealth, they would never agree in the Choice of any one of themſelves; and they would rather chuſe to remain Noblemen of a Republick, where they ſhar'd the Authority with a hundred others, than be Princes of the Blood Royal, and Brothers to the King.

VI. *Expenſive Governments inſtituted on purpoſe to drain the Coffers of the rich Nobility.*

The Governments of greateſt Splendour and Dignity, which are called expenſive Governments, and which are left deſignedly with ſmall Incomes by the Wiſdom of our Anceſtors, that they may ſerve as a means to drain the Coffers of the Noblemen, that are too rich, ought to be diſtributed purſuant to the intention of thoſe who inſtituted them;

them; that is, to ſuch Perſons as have the Means and the Inclination to keep up the Splendour and Dignity of ſuch Imployments. For if they are given to ſuch Perſons as have not wherewithal to ſupply the exceſſive Charges, they will be ſure to make the Government it ſelf do it either by fair or foul means; and if they are Perſons of a genteel mannerly Education, they'l try to do it rather by ſharping ways, than by downright Extortion and Rapine: and as by this way they get the Hatred, ſo by the other they loſe the Reſpect of the Subjects. This is a matter of great importance, and whoever adminiſters any ſuch Government ſordidly and indecently, deſerves very ill at the hands of his Country, becauſe he renders contemptible the Perſon who repreſents its Sovereign; and all Rebellions of Subjects have had their firſt riſe from the Contempt of the Prince.

VII. *How Abuſes committed by the Nobility and the Commonalty, are to be puniſh'd.*

As to the Abuſes committed by the Nobility, that are not in any Place of publick Truſt. If the Offence is committed by one Nobleman againſt another that is equal to him in Fortune, provided they have made up the matter between themſelves, the Government may wink at it. If the Injury is done by a Nobleman of high rank, to one

one of the ſame Quality that is reduced to Poverty, it is neceſſary to revenge it with ſome rigour, leſt the neglect of affording him the publick Protection ſhould ſtir up the bad Humours of all the poor Nobility. If it is a Nobleman of great following that has received the Injury, from a Nobleman of an inferiour Rank, the Offender is to be puniſh'd ſeverely, leſt the injur'd Party ſeeing himſelf fruſtrated of the publick Authority, ſhould attempt to do himſelf Juſtice by the force of his Adherents. When the Offence is committed by a Nobleman againſt a Subject, let all ways be try'd to juſtify him; and if that is not poſſible to be done, let him be chaſtis'd with greater noiſe than damage. If it is a Subject that has affronted a Nobleman, let him be puniſh'd with the utmoſt Severity, that the Subjects may not get too great a Cuſtom of laying their hands on the Patrician Order; and that the Opinion may be preſerv'd, as much as is poſſible, that our Nobility is come of ſacred and venerable Blood. The Abuſes committed by the Common People, one againſt another, may be judged in the ordinary way; and here Juſtice may be adminiſtred impartially, there being no political Conſideration to hinder it. Nay,

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in this caſe it might not be improper to imitate *Cato*, who fomented Diſcord among the Slaves of his own Family, and to entertain our Commonalty in continual Diviſions and Jarrings among themſelves; for which end it was, that our Anceſtors permitted the little pitch'd Battels among the People [b].

[b] The Senate of *Venice* being apprehenſive of the Danger that might ariſe to their Government from too great a Correſpondence and Union among the Common People, who would be able, if their Forces were united, to wreſt the Power out of the hands of the Nobles, does induſtriouſly cheriſh two Factions in the City; one of which goes by the Name of *Caſtellans*, and the other of *Nicolots*. There is ſuch an Emulation between theſe two Factions, that all their ſtudy is how to ſpite and vex one another. And if their Children happen to meet in the Streets, and know one another to be of different Parties, they ſeldom fail to fight it out at Fiſty-cuffs, and the Spectators never offer to part them, till the one has drawn Blood of the other, that he who is vanquiſh'd may be thereby animated to take his revenge ſome time or other on his Adverſary. The Senate ſometimes allows theſe Parties to try their Strength in pitch'd Battels at Handy-blows, under pretence of giving Diverſion to Foreign Princes and Ambaſſadors, that paſs thro' the City; but in reality, that they may keep up the Animoſity and Spite that is between the two Factions. The *Nicolots* have a Doge of their own, who is uſually ſome Tradeſman, living in that Quarter of the Town which is called St. *Nicholas*.

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VIII. *Juſtice to be impartially adminiſtred in the Civil Courts.*

In the Courts of Civil Judicature, it would be neceſſary to avoid all manner of Partiality and Paſſion, and to aboliſh every thing that may give the leaſt ground to the bad Report that has got abroad, as if Juſtice were partially adminiſtred in favour of a Nobleman, and one that is rich. So that to root out this pernicious Conceit, no Advantage ought to be allow'd in Tryals of Law on the account of Rank; for a poor Man, who ſees his Cauſe decided againſt him only becauſe of his Poverty, will be apt to baniſh himſelf thro' Deſpair. And with reſpect to the Adminiſtration of Civil Juſtice, there can never be too much care taken in making it appear to be upright and ſincere, this being a very material Foundation of the State. For when the Subject ſees that he has Juſtice impartially done him, when he has Right on his ſide; he is induced to bear eaſily with many other Burthens: Whereas on the other hand, when a Man is wrong'd in his Eſtate, altho' he ſhould be graciouſly pardon'd for all the Crimes and Offences he has been guilty of againſt the State, yet he'll never prove a good Subject. For an Injury that is done us is never forgotten; but the Memory of a Favour we have received ſoon vaniſhes.

Care

IX.

The People not to be allow'd to assemble in great Multitudes.

Care muſt be taken to prevent, as much as we would do the Plague, the People from flocking together in great numbers; becauſe there needs no more for overturning the Commonwealth, than to leave it eaſy for the People to unite together in any Conference [a]. Nay, this aſſembling together in great Multitudes is ſo dangerous to the State, that it is neceſſary to ſhew a Deteſtation and Abhorrence of it, even among the Noblemen. For as in every Human Body there are many corrupt Humours, which if ſeparated, and kept aſunder, either do no harm, or are eaſily cured; but if they begin to move, and unite together, they become ſtubborn, and ſometimes mortal. It is exactly the ſame with the Body Politick, as with the Human Body. A watchful Eye muſt be kept over all diſſatisfied Perſons, or thoſe that are

[a] It is in conformity to this Advice, that the *Venetians* do not allow of any Coffee-houſes in their City, that are able to contain great numbers of People. Their Coffee-houſes are generally little Shops, that will not hold above five or ſix Perſons at a time, and perhaps there are not Seats for above two or three. So that the Company having no where to reſt themſelves, are gone as ſoon as they have made an end of drinking their Coffee.

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inclin'd to Sedition, or Men of great Speculation, particularly when they presume to censure the Government. A Stop must be put to the growth of Heresy, which at first was introduced in no other manner, than by way of pleasant Wit, and Curiosity.

X. *The Arsenal to be kept always in good condition.*

The Arsenal ought always to be kept in a good condition; and altho' there be no pressing Occasion for fitting out a Fleet, yet it is convenient that our Governours consider, and have it always in their minds, that a Prince may destroy in one Day thousands of Men, but that it is not in the power of Mankind to make so much as one Man be born, or conceived, in an instant; so that as to those things which depend on Time, it is necessary to anticipate them with Time. The Artisans belonging to the Arsenal are to be kept easy and contented; and no Charges ought to be spar'd in a thing on which depends the universal Welfare. When any of these Workmen are found guilty of a Fault, they ought to be chastis'd as a Father chastises his Son, that is, with an appearance of Rigour, but still with so much Gentleness, as that he be not quite frighten'd from the House.

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XI.

The Secretaries[d] of the Republick, and all other Perſons that are let into the knowledge of the publick Intereſts, ought

The Secretaries to be choſen with great care, and not raſhly turn'd out.

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[d] The Secretaries belonging to the Republick are divided into three Claſſes. The firſt in Rank and Dignity conſiſts of thoſe who are Secretaries to the Council of Ten. They are four in number, and their Office is in great eſteem, becauſe of the great Juriſdiction of the Tribunal to which they belong. The ſecond Claſs contains the Secretaries to the Senate, who are in all twenty four; and of theſe there are five or ſix always imployed as Reſidents in *Naples*, *Milan*, *Florence*, *Swiſſerland*, &c. having an allowance of two thouſand Ducats a Year. Of this number likewiſe there are always five or ſix imployed as Secretaries to the Embaſſies, which the Republick ſends to foreign Courts; where the Senate obliges their Secretaries to reſide for ſome Years, that they may have time to inform themſelves thorowly of the Government and Intereſts of thoſe Countries, and be able to give the neceſſary Inſtructions to the Ambaſſadors that are ſent thither. So that the Secretaries are not uſually recalled from the Courts to which they are ſent, till they have ſerved under two or three Ambaſſadors. Theſe are the Secretaries who aſſiſt in the College at the Audiences given to the Ambaſſadors of Princes, that they may make Report to the College in a few words, of the Propoſals, or Demands, made by theſe Ambaſſadors. They carry the Senate's Anſwer to the Ambaſſadors, which they firſt read in the Ambaſſador's Preſence, and afterwards indite to his Secretray, they bringing back their own Copy with them, which they are required not to part with on pain of Death.

The Secretaries of theſe two Claſſes are let into

ought to be Men of able Parts, and zealous for the publick Good; but if they chance to be Men of weak Abili-

into the knowledge of all the publick Tranſactions, it being their Office to read in the College, and in the Senate, all the Letters that are ſent to the Republick, and to draw up thoſe which the Senate ſends to Princes. Theſe Secretaries have each of them a Sallary of 400 Ducats a Year, beſides conſiderable Perquiſites and Privileges annex'd to their Office.

The Secretaries of the third Claſs are not fix'd to any certain number, and their Office is almoſt like to that of Clerks, or Regiſters, in Courts of Juſtice. For they write the Sentences that are pronounced in the Courts of Juſtice that ſit in the Palace of St. *Mark*, and in the *Rialto*, and give them out to the Parties. They likewiſe draw up Contracts of Marriage, Teſtaments, and other Deeds belonging to Notaries. So that, properly ſpeaking, they are only Publick Notaries, or Regiſters, and are not admitted into the knowledge of the Affairs of State. However, they riſe gradually from this lower Claſs to the other two, which are more conſiderable.

Theſe three Orders of Secretaries depend wholly on the Council of Ten, who has the election of them; and if any of them fail in their Duty, they are accountable to this dreadful Tribunal. It is out of this College of Secretaries, that the Chanceſſor of the Republick is always choſen, who is the Head, or Doge, as it were, of all the Citizens that are not noble. His Office is both honourable and profitable. His Sallary is three thouſand Ducats a Year, and the Perquiſites of his Place amount yearly to about nine or ten thouſand Ducats, and he is not oblig'd to be at any expence. Altho' he is not Noble, yet he has all the Privileges of the Nobility, and ſome that are peculiar to his Office.

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ties, yet they are to be born with. It is fit to examine well into their Qualifications before they are receiv'd into the Office, but when they are once admitted, they ought to be kept in, ſuch as they are. For there are but few Perſons capable of doing good, and every one is able to do miſchief; and it is much eaſier to guard our ſelves againſt the Snares of a powerful Enemy without doors, than of a wicked Servant that lives in the Family.

XII. *Arts peculiar to the City to be encouraged.*

Let the Arts that are peculiar to the City be carefully preſerv'd, and in order to that, they ought not to be overcharg'd with great Burthens. For *Gain*, which has been able to perſuade Men to go in ſearch of new Worlds, with the hazard of their Lives, if it is not found by the Merchant in the place where he expects it, he'll go in queſt of it elſewhere, even to the *Antipodes*. The Crafts-men belonging to theſe Arts ought to be encouraged to remain in their Country, and not to travel abroad [e]. For an Art is only an ima-

[e] It is in obſervance of this Maxim, that the *Venetians* have thought fit to confer ſuch diſtinguiſhing Marks of their Favour on the Glaſs-workers of *Muran*. The Senate being ſenſible of the great Profit the Republick made by their Manufacture of Glaſs, to encourage the Tradeſmen belonging to that Art to remain among them,

ginary Being, which has its Exiſtence no where but in the Brain of the Artificer, who is Maſter both of the Speculation and Practice. And if the Art once become common to many places, it loſes the half of its advantage, which conſiſts in being uſeful to our ſelves, and helpful to others.

XIII. *Marriages between the Nobility and Plebeians ſometimes convenient.*

Marriages between the Nobility, and Women of an inferiour Rank, may be tolerated, eſpecially when the Women carry great Portions along with them; for by this means it often happens, that the Labours and Toils of many Plebeians for ſeveral Ages, go to enrich one Noble Family. And this is a pleaſant kind of Partition, which altho' it may eclipſe the Splendour of the Nobility in ſome meaſure, yet that is only in things meerly ſuperficial; but in things that are more ſubſtantial, it adds to the greatneſs of the Order, and fortifies it. Nor is it to be fear'd, that the Offspring of ſuch Marriages will prove low and mean ſpirited; for there is nothing debaſes the Spirit more than Poverty. Beſides, we are to conſider

them, they made them all Burgeſſes of *Venice*, and allowed the Nobles to marry their Daughters without degrading from their Nobility. Whereas if a Nobleman marry the Daughter of any other Tradeſman, the Children of that Marriage are not reputed Noble.

ſider the great Advantage that accrues to the Nobility by bringing, by this means, the Commonalty to be cordially in their intereſt, who are bound, by this ſoft and agreeable Chain, to ſupport and maintain the Authority of the Nobles.

XIV. *The great Honours to be diſtributed among the ancient Nobility.*

The great Honours of the Country ought to be diſtributed, as much as can be, among the ancient Nobility, except when any of the new Pretenders have ſome extraordinary perſonal Merit, in which caſe all Prodigality becomes a Virtue. But otherwiſe to confer great Honours on Perſons that are not able to count to the third or fourth Generation, would be to give occaſion of Wonder to the Subjects, and of Envy to the Nobles. It would likewiſe encourage the moſt abject among the Nobility to pretend to high Preferments, and they not finding themſelves advanced to any higher condition than what their indifferent Parts deſerve, would not be able to ſatisfy themſelves why ſuch a one ſhould have attain'd to great Preferment, and they remain excluded. Beſides, to feed a Stomach, that has always been accuſtom'd to a ſlender Diet, with high ſeaſon'd Meats, ſuch as are ſerv'd up to the Table of a Prince, would be the ready way to make it fall ſick for want of digeſtion.

Then the Subjects are not eaſily prevail'd with to ſhew an extraordinary Reſpect for one, for whom they have been accuſtom'd to have but a ſlender regard; and they are apt to fancy, that the Dignity is not very conſiderable, when it is confer'd on a Perſon of no great note.

XV. *Republicks defective in having too great numbers in their Councils.*

And becauſe all ſublunary Bodies are liable to Corruption, and Commonwealths more than others, they being Bodies made up of many Individuals, ſo that the Defect increaſes with the number of the Members; I muſt therefore beg leave to ſpeak my Mind freely in this point, without which I cannot well perform the Service you require of me. My Opinion therefore is, that the Republick of *Venice* is obnoxious to this Fatality, from which no other Commonwealth has ever been exempted; and if any Perſon has pretended to give us an Idea of a Commonwealth without Blemiſh, it has been no more than a bare Fiction, that never was reduced to Practice. The Defect of our Republick is in being too numerous[f], in order to preſerve

[f] The number of the *Venetian* Nobility in former Days was very great, having amounted to about four thouſand and five hundred; but many Families being extinct, they do not now exceed

preſerve its Ariſtocratical Form. So that it would be convenient to procure, with all manner of Induſtry, the Great Council to delegate a great Share of its

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exceed two thouſand, notwithſtanding of the additional Families that have been aggregated to their Nobility at different times. Formerly there have been about fifteen or ſixteen hundred Noblemen aſſembled in the Great Council, but now they ſeldom exceed eight or nine hundred. When the Great Council is aſſembled about the Election of Magiſtrates, they do not much mind what number of Noblemen meet together. But when the Council is called to make new Laws, or to conſider of any Buſineſs of great Importance, it is requiſite that there be preſent in the Council at leaſt ſix hundred Noblemen. The Great Council being therefore ſuch a numerous Aſſembly, and it being impoſſible, for that reaſon, to avoid Confuſion in their Proceedings, ſince all the Noblemen that are paſt five and twenty Years of Age have a Right to ſit in it; Father *Paul* is for having all Buſineſs, except that of the Creation of Magiſtrates, taken out of the Hands of the Great Council, and carried before the Senate, or Council of Ten. The Senate conſiſts of about three hundred Nobles; many of which, altho' they are entitled by their Offices to be preſent at the Deliberations of the Senate; yet they have no right to vote. And of thoſe that have a right to vote, there are not above ſix and twenty that are allowed to make any new Propoſal to the Senate. And theſe are the Doge and his ſix Counſellors, the three Preſidents of the Council of Forty for Criminal Affairs, and the ſixteen *Sages*, who are, as it were, the chief Miniſters of State to the Republick, they having all the publick Affairs can-

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Authority to the Senate, and to the Council of Ten; but in ſuch a hidden and ſecret manner, as that it may not be diſcover'd, till after it is done. For ſince

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ton'd out among them into ſo many Provinces. The five Sages who are called *Savii di Mare*, or *Savii degli Ordini*, have the Inſpection over all the Naval Affairs. The five *Savii di Terra Ferma* take care of all the Affairs that concern the Territories which the Republick has on the Continent. The ſix *Savii Grandi*, who are the chief of all the Sages, have a tranſcendent Authority over all thoſe Affairs, whether they concern Sea or Land. And beſides, they have a particular Power to preſcribe and direct in every thing that relates to Peace or War, to draw up the Letters which the Republick ſends to Princes; and, in a word, to give Counſel and Advice in every thing that concerns the Republick. The other Senators are only to approve or diſapprove of whatever is propoſed by thoſe Perſons that are authorized to make Overtures to the Senate; and if any Senator thinks of any Expedient that may be more proper than what has been already offer'd, he muſt get one of them to make the Propoſal to the Senate. The reaſon of this Order, is to prevent all manner of Confuſion in the Deliberations of this Aſſembly, which could not well be avoided, if all the Senators were left at liberty to propoſe in the Senate whatever appear'd to them to be expedient. Beſides, it is not very likely that any thing that is truly expedient, and uſeful to the Republick, ſhould be altogether omitted by thoſe ſix and twenty Perſons who are authorized to make the Overtures; or if it is omitted by them, the Senator who thinks of the Expedient, may convince one of thoſe ſix and twenty Perſons of the

ſince it has already diveſted it ſelf of ſome Branches of its Power, and ſince we ſee that this has had wonderful Succeſs in the *Deliberative* part of the Government; ſo likewiſe if it reſign'd its Right as to the *Judiciary* and *Diſtributive* parts of the Adminiſtration, we might hope thereby to ſee the Conſtitution of the Republick much mended. It cannot be denied, but the Great Council ſavours a little of the Mob, and that it is, for this reaſon, ſubject to impetuous Deliberations, and that the Affairs which are laid before it, are not always ſo maturely weigh'd and conſider'd, as Matters of that Importance deſerve. And truly I ſtand amazed, when I conſider that our Anceſtors, who were Men of great Judgment, and zealous for the publick Good, did not take the Advantage of the Simplicity of the Times in which they liv'd, and make one Step farther towards reforming our Conſtitution: if not in any other thing, at leaſt in continuing the Senators longer in their Of-

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the Uſefulneſs of it, and get him to propoſe it to the Senate. It happens by this means, that Matters are tranſacted in the Senate with a great deal of Gravity and Sedateneſs, and notwithſtanding the great Numbers of that Aſſembly, with a Secrecy that is altogether ſurprizing, and perhaps peculiar to the *Venetian* Councils.

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fice than from Year to Year, without a new Confirmation from the Great Council. For as the Practice of obliging the Senators to be confirmed every Year anew, ſeems to guard us, on the one hand, againſt the Tyranny of the Grandees; ſo it expoſes us, on the other hand, to the Tyranny of the lower Nobility, which is ſo much the more odious, becauſe they are more in number, and have leſs Experience in publick Affairs. We ſhould ſee much more Vigour in the Reſolutions of our Senators, if they were not bound to cringe perpetually to the other Nobles, for their Vote to continue them in the Senate from Year to Year.

XVI. *Great Caution to be uſed in the choice of* Avogadors.

The Office of *Avogador*[s] ought to

[s] The *Avogadors* are three in number; and their Office is much like that of our Attorney-General, but their Power is of a much larger extent. They are not only the Proſecutors of Criminals, but they are alſo the Guardians of the Laws; they are to take care that they be ſtrictly obſerved by Perſons of all Ranks, and that the Magiſtrates do their Duty in adminiſtring Juſtice in their ſeveral Stations. They have Power to carry the Criminal Cauſes either before the Council of Forty appointed for Criminal Matters, before the Senate, or before the Great Council, according as they judge the Cauſe to be of greater or leſs Importance. The Senate, and Great Council cannot aſſemble, unleſs there is one *Avogador* preſent, otherwiſe their Deliberations are of no force.

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be diſpoſed of with great Caution, and given to Perſons of the greateſt Rank. For if the Perſons who are put into this Office be of a noble and high Spirit, ſuch as ſcorn to creep and crouch to the multitude of the great Council; the Senate, and Council of Ten might venture upon many Deliberations, as occaſion requires, which, altho' they exceeded their ordinary Authority, would nevertheleſs be thought fit to be born with, and Time would authorize their medling in ſuch matters without the Concurrence of the Council. But ſhould an *Avogador*, in order to make himſelf popular, carry every thing of this kind before the Council; they, out of Jealouſie leſt their Authority ſhould be encroach'd upon, would certainly annul every thing that the Senate had decreed, let it be never ſo expedient. If it happen that the Office of *Avogador* is not conferr'd on ſuch Perſons as are more inclin'd to ſupport the Dignity of the Senate, than to make themſelves popular among the lower Nobility; it is fit, at leaſt, to pitch upon ſuch Perſons, as are either of a low mean Spirit; or if they are of brisk lively Parts, let them be ſuch whoſe Reputation is not altogether entire, but blemiſh'd with the Imputation of Sordidneſs; that if they

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are Persons of weak Parts, they may not be able, and if they have good Talents, and a bad Reputation, they may not dare to enter the Lists with the Senators. For otherwise an *Avogador* that has Parts, Integrity and Malice, may easily set fire to the four Corners of the Republick.

XVII. *The Councils of Forty inconvenient to the State.*

For these and such like Reasons it would be convenient to diminish the Authority of the Councils of Forty[h], because they are Assemblies that are too

[h] There are three Councils of Forty; one of which is called *Quarantia Criminale*, it being appointed for the Trial of all Criminal Causes. The other two are for Civil Causes; one of them has the Name of *Quarantia Civile Vecchia*, and has Cognizance of all Appeals from the Sentences of all the Courts of Justice within the City of *Venice*. The other is called *Quarantia Civile Nuova*, and to this Court there lies an Appeal from the Sentences of all the Judges in the Territories belonging to the Republick without the City. The Judges of these three Courts mount gradually from one Court to the other. They are first chose into the *Quarantia Civile Nuova*, as being the Court of least Esteem, where they sit Judges for eight Months; then they are translated to the *Quarantia Civile Vecchia*, where they sit other eight Months; and at last they mount to the *Quarantia Criminale*, where they officiate likewise eight Months; and then their Office of Judicature expires. But after an Interval of eight Months, they are capable of being chosen anew into the *Quarantia Civile Nuova*.

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popular, inſtituted with ſo great Numbers, on purpoſe to avoid the Danger of expoſing Juſtice to Sale; but at the ſame time they bring us under another great Inconvenience, in aſſembliug together ſo many bad and corrupt Humours, and thereby endangering our Conſtitution. And as the Phyſitian to the Body deſerves to be excuſed, if to heal the Liver he offends the Stomach; ſo it is likewiſe the beſt Method the State Phyſitian can take with the Commonwealth. In the Council of Forty appointed for Civil Affairs, their Authority may be born with; but in the Council of Forty for Criminal Matters, it will be convenient always to leſſen it; and this may be done, if the Council of Ten aſſume to themſelves the Judgment of every Cauſe that has but the leaſt appearance of belonging to their Cognizance; and if the Senate, and great Council abſtain wholly from delegating any Cauſes to this Council of Forty, as they uſe often to do. I ſhould think it well for the Republick, if theſe Councils of Forty were totally aboliſh'd; but at the ſame time I ſhould think it abſolutely neceſſary, that a Maintenance were provided ſome other way, for ſuch a number of idle and indigent Nobles, as are employed in theſe Councils.

cils. But as matters ſtand at preſent, I ſhould look upon it as a great piece of Service done to the Country, if every Family of the ancient and rich Nobility did always appoint one of the Brothers to be employed in theſe Councils of Forty, that they might hinder the poor Nobility from getting into them in ſo great numbers, which would be a way to keep them more eaſily under. And all imaginable Care ought to be taken to find out ſome ſpecious Pretext, for taking away from the inferior Nobility the power of judging the Nobles in Criminal Matters; and this would be a means to make them loſe, in a great meaſure, their Privilege of Nobility. I ſhould be very well pleas'd likewiſe to ſee them excluded from the Senate; but this is a thing more to be deſired, than expected.

XVIII. *Care muſt be taken to have all Proviſions in plenty.*

The common People muſt always be provided with plenty of thoſe things that are neceſſary for Food and Raiment, and at as cheap a rate as may be. For the Nature of the Mob is ſuch, that altho' a Dearth is occaſion'd by a bad Harveſt, yet they always impute it to the Avarice of the Nobility; ſo that whoever would make them hold their peace, muſt always ſtop their Mouths.

XIX. *As many of the poor People to be employed in the Service of the Publick as is poſſible.*

It will be proper to employ as great a number of the common People as is poſſible in the Service of the Publick; that they getting their Bread from the Publick, may be well affected to the Government; and that there may be fewer Perſons expos'd to die of Hunger. For if Hunger forces impregnable Fortreſſes to ſurrender, it will likewiſe make People expoſe their Lives to any manner of Hazard, rather than loſe them. I would adviſe however now and then the employing of ſuch Perſons, as have whereupon to live tolerably well; for otherwiſe to employ a Man, and not to afford him Means to live handſomly, is to give him as it it were a juſt occaſion of ſtealing.

XX. *The Women to live in Retirement.*

Let the Women be kept chaſt, and in order to that, let them live retir'd from the World; it being certain, that all open Lewdneſs has had its firſt riſe from a Salutation, from a Smile.

XXI. *The Noblemen not to be ſuffer'd to interpoſe themſelves magiſterially in private Differences.*

Care muſt be taken to repreſs the Abuſe that is lately crept in among us, by Noblemen's taking upon them to be Judges of private Differences between Man and Man, and forcing the Subjects to make Peace, to pay Debts, to contract Marriages, and to deſiſt from proſecuting their Rights in the ordinary Courts of Juſtice.

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For this is the greateſt Tyranny that the Subject can be liable to, and is able to produce another *Sicilian Veſpers*, and not unlikely to ſet the Noblemen themſelves together by the Ears, in the defence of their ſeveral Clients.

XXII. *The Publick Faith to be obſerv'd inviolably.*

On all Occaſions that the Publick Faith is engaged, it is neceſſary to obſerve it inviolably, without being amus'd by any Profit that may accrue to the Republick by the breach of it. And it is fit to conſider, that the Benefit reap'd by breaking it, is momentary; but the Damage that follows upon the not obſerving it, is perpetual. For a Prince that once breaks his Word, if he will have himſelf to be believ'd afterwards in what he ſays, it is neceſſary that he invent a new Religion, that may be able to tie him, ſince his firſt Obligation had not force enough to bind him. If a private Perſon, who makes no Conſcience of keeping his Promiſe, renders himſelf thereby incapable of receiving any Supply from others, ſo that People will hardly truſt him even when he goes with ready Money in his Hand; how much leſs Credit will a Prince find, after Breach of Promiſe, who is not ſubject to any Magiſtrate, that can compel him to pay what he owes;

owes; and who is bound by no other Law than his own Will and Pleasure?

XXIII. *The Nobility ought not to trade.*

The Nobility must abstain from merchandizing, it being the only way to engage Merchants to settle in the City; for if the Noblemen trade, the Merchants will be afraid of being cheated, and over-awed in their Business. The *Spaniards*, who bear no good Will to the *Venetians*, have not a more odious Title to give *Venice*, than by calling it a Republick of Merchants. By the ancient Law, a Nobleman, whose Blood was tainted with Merchandize, could not enter into the Turnament, as not being reputed an equal to Gentlemen. Trade may in a short time either excessively enrich, or extremely impoverish a Family, and neither the one, nor the other is expedient in a Commonwealth. The Merchant is of necessity a Foreigner, he having Commerce, and Interest in other Nations; whereas a Nobleman ought to have his Affections no where but in his own Country. If the Politicians tell us, that it is not for the good of a City, to have too sumptuous Buildings in the Country about it; because if an Enemy happen to besiege the City, the Citizens, for fear of seeing their Country Seats ruin'd

will be eaſily induced to deliver up the Town: What then ſhall we ſay of thoſe Noblemen, that by trading may have many hundreds, nay thouſands of Crowns in foreign Countries, and very often in Countries that are at War with the Republick? Beſides, whoever brings new Commodities into a City, brings along with them at the ſame time new Cuſtoms. In the beginning of the Republick, trading was neceſſary to redeem it from Poverty, but now it is become ſuſpected as a Fomenter of too great Riches. Milk, which is good Food for a Child, is not ſo proper for a Stomach that can bear with a ſtronger Diet. Cities likewiſe have their own Periods; what is fit for them in their Infancy, is not proper in a riper Age. The *Genoeſes*, who retain this Cuſtom of Trading, are but little reſpected among other Princes; they are more regarded one by one, than all in a Body together.

XXIV. *All exceſſive Pomp to be baniſh'd.*

Let all exceſſive Pomp be baniſh'd. If this Magnificence in Apparel and Equipage were practis'd only by the rich, it might be profitable to the Commonwealth; becauſe it would be a means of evacuating the Blood of thoſe that are of too ſanguine a Complexion; but the Emulation that runs among the Citizens to out-do one another, would make

make many Families ruine themſelves, to keep up the ſame Grandeur with others. If this Diſtinction could be introduced, it would be a continual Purge for the bad Humours of the State; but there being no poſſibility of bringing it about, it is the ſame thing as if one ſhould take every day Phyſick inſtead of Food, which would ſoon put an end to the Diſtemper, and to the Life of the Patient at the ſame time. Whoever is under a neceſſity of doing what he cannot, to enable himſelf to do it, he will uſe means that are not lawful. It is ſaid, that Gold is a trial of the Chaſtity of Women; in this caſe it would be a Temptation both to Women and Men, not only as to their Honour, but likewiſe their Juſtice, and Fidelity.

XXV. *A punctual Obedience to be paid to the Laws.*

Before a Law is made, it is fit to conſider well of it, and not to be over-haſty in paſſing it; but when once it is enacted, great care ought to be taken to ſee it punctually obey'd; for whoſoever ſuffers Diſobedience in leſſer things, teaches the Practice of it in matters of greater Moment. A Nobleman that places his Greatneſs in ſhewing a Diſobedience to the Laws, does more Injury to his Country, and to himſelf, by this bad Example, than by all his other Diſſoluteneſs what-

ever; becauſe he thereby impugns directly the publick Authority. In a Monarchical Government this Abuſe may be more eaſily redreſs'd, than in a Commonwealth; becauſe if the ſucceeding Monarch ſhews but a reſoluteneſs of Mind to have the Laws punctually obſerv'd, this alone is enough to teach the Subjects Obedience. But a Commonwealth, which is always the ſame, can never perſuade People of this difference of Temper in its Governours, as there is in the Succeſſors to a Crown; and to root out of a Commonwealth any Abuſe that has grown old among the Nobility, would coſt at leaſt the Lives of half the Citizens.

XXVI. *When any thing is reſolv'd on that is againſt the Inclinations of the People, it will be fit to make them believe, that it was carried only by a ſmall Majority.*

If it happen, that any Reſolution is taken by the Government, which may ſeem to be unacceptable to the People, eſpecially in matters of Judgment, it will be convenient to give it out, that this was carried by a ſmall Majority of Voices; that if the People have no other Satisfaction, they may at leaſt have this, of flattering themſelves with having had many Perſons of the ſame Sentiment with them.

XXVII. *Secrecy to be enjoin'd ſtrictly to all the Nobility.*

Let the Secret of the Republick be kept inviolably: And it is fit that our Nobility always remember the great

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Vogue the *Venetian* Prudence was in, upon the Condemnation of *Carmignola*, whoſe Sentence was kept ſecret for eight whole Months, notwithſtanding it was pronounced in Preſence of three hundred Judges; a thing which abſolute Princes are not able to find in the Fidelity of only three or four Miniſters, altho' exceſſively loaded by them with Benefits. It was a matter of no leſs Aſtoniſhment, when the Doge *Foſcari* was depoſed, to ſee that his Condemnation was conceal'd from him even by his own Brother. It cannot but be a great Affliction to all that wiſh well to their Country, to ſee ſo excellent a Quality, as this of Secrecy, and ſo peculiar to our Republick, diminiſh'd, in ſome meaſure, by the inconſiderateneſs of our Youth; who altho' they have no bad Deſign in what they do, yet out of a heedleſſneſs, and too great freedom of Temper, blab out things of the greateſt Importance. It would be neceſſary that every Father of a Noble Family, at the ſame time that he inſtructs his Children in the Chriſtian Religion, ſhould teach them likewiſe the uſe of Secrecy. And to avoid the Danger of loſing it, it ought not to be allowed to any Perſons whatever, not even to the Noblemen that

assist in Council, to discourse of the publick Transactions, out of the Council Chamber.

XXVIII. *Honours to be dispensed gradually.*

The Honours of the Country ought to be dispensed gradually, and all Flights of this kind are to be avoided as being highly pernicious. To see a Cloud all of a sudden cover'd over with Light, is a certain sign of approaching Thunder. It savours too much of the Comedian, for a private Man to be transform'd in an instant into a Prince. When Honours are distributed gradually, it hinders young People from getting at them too soon. And it is certain, that as a Physitian of indifferent Learning, but of long Experience, is to be preferr'd to one that has a great deal of Reading, but little or no Practice; so for governing the Republick, it is better to make use of Persons that have been often employed in Business, altho' they are not Men of the quickest Parts.

XXIX. *Appeals in Causes relating to Church Benefices ought to be carried before the Senate.*

It is very proper to have the Causes relating to Church Benefices tried in the Courts at *Venice*, but at the same time it would be very convenient to have the Appeals in such Causes carried before the Senate, and not before the Council of Forty, because it oftentimes happens that such Causes are to be decided by Reasons of State, of

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which the Judges of this Court are either altogether ignorant, or very careleſs. Beſides, it argues no great Harmony in the Subordination of our Courts, that a Sentence pronounced in Preſence of the Doge and his Council, ſhould be liable to be cenſur'd by the Council of Forty, a Court of ſo little Eſteem. If care were taken to reprimand ſeverely, but ſecretly, the Parties concern'd in thoſe Appeals, or their Advocates, perhaps the Cuſtom of carrying them before the Senate, might in time come to have the force of a Law. If it ſhould happen, that any one procured for himſelf a Deciſion in the *Ruota*[i] at *Rome*, it would be neceſſary to command him under a ſevere Penalty to renounce what he

[i] The *Ruota* is a Court of Juſtice eſtabliſh'd at *Rome*, conſiſting of twelve Prelates, whereof one is a *German*, one a Native of *France*, two *Spaniards*, and the other eight are *Italians*; one a *Venetian*, one from *Bolonia*, one from *Ferrara*, one out of *Toſcany*, one out of the Dutchy of *Milan*, and three *Romans*. Their Juriſdiction extends to all Cauſes relating to Church Benefices, in all Roman Catholick Countries whatever. And likewiſe Civil Cauſes in the City of *Rome*, and within the Territories of the Church, are brought before this Court by way of Appeal. Sometimes Roman Catholick Princes do, by mutual Conſent, refer their Differences to the Arbitration of this Court.

had obtain'd in his Favour. Becauſe otherwiſe all theſe Cauſes would be carried to *Rome*, where all Penſions laid upon Benefices are held as ſacred, and by this means, the Republick would loſe a fourth part of its Judiciary Power in Civil Matters. There is no great harm, if the Auditor of the *Ruota* for the Republick is left as a Biſhop *in partibus*, having an empty Title, without any Subjects.

XXX. *The Biſhops of the State ought always to be preconis'd in Conſiſtory by a* Venetian *Cardinal.*

The Biſhops of the State of the Republick ought always to be preconiſed in Conſiſtory by a *Venetian* Cardinal [k], but without the Circumſtance of

[k] The Republick of *Venice* being deſirous to maintain to it ſelf an equal Rank in all things with Kings, is jealous of the leaſt Favour that is granted to Crown'd Heads, which the Republick does not likewiſe enjoy. The Emperor, and the other Crowns of the Romiſh Religion, when they diſpoſe of any Biſhopricks within their Dominions, they have them preconiſed in the Conſiſtory at *Rome* by a Cardinal of their own Nation, or by ſome other Cardinal whom the Princes depute for that end. The Republick of *Venice*, that it may not be in any thing diſtinguiſh'd from Kings, inſiſts on the ſame Right. It is alſo upon this account, that the Republick has ſo earneſtly, and ſo long ſollicited the Court of *Rome*, to grant them a Power to nominate one of their Subjects to a Cardinal's Cap, when the Pope makes his Promotion of Cardinals for the Crowns. They demand likewiſe that the Nuncio who is ſent to their

of creating him Procurator for the Republick; becauſe he would not take the Name of Procurator, but that of Protector, as thoſe for the Crowns have done very improperly. And if any ſuch Deputation were once made, perhaps the Court of *Rome* might deſiſt from creating any *Venetians* Cardinals, on purpoſe to oblige the Republick to have recourſe to a Cardinal of another Nation; which in time might be ſome Prejudice to the Rank which the Republick holds among the Crown'd Heads. If the Preconiſation is made by any other Cardinal than a *Venetian*, it were fit to deny the Perſon preconiſed the temporal Poſſeſſion of his Biſhoprick, and to declare his Election, and any Penſion laid upon the Biſhoprick, to be null and void. It is true, that when the Preconiſation is made by the Cardinal Nephew, who has the Character of a Noble *Venetian*, it ought not to be refuſed, altho' he be not a *Venetian* by Extraction.

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their Republick, may be immediately advanced from his Nunciature to the Cardinalſhip, without being ſent Nuncio to any other Court; becauſe this Honour is paid to the Nunciatures of the Empire, *France* and *Spain*. But none of theſe Requeſts have they been able hitherto to obtain.

If

XXXI. *The Republick ought to ſtrive to obtain from the Popes, all the Titles and Prerogatives which they give to Crown'd Heads.*

If ever it ſhould happen, that one is raiſed to the Papacy, I ſhall not ſay one that is a *Venetian* born, becauſe this would only make a noiſe, and be of no great advantage, nay on the contrary, occaſion conſiderable damage to the Republick; but one that is of another Country, and well affected to the Republick, it would be convenient to get him to grant to the Republick for ever the Tithes of the Clergy, as it was formerly under *Clement* the VI. the Bull of which is unhappily loſt. And this would free the Republick from the Obligation of asking this Favour every five, or every ſeven Years. It would be very proper likewiſe to lay hold of ſuch a favourable Opportunity, for getting this addition to be made to the other Prerogatives which the Republick already enjoys; that the Pope, in the Title which he gives to the Doge, ſhould uſe the ſuperlative Degree, and call him *moſt affectionate*, or *moſt beloved*, as he does Kings. This would be a great Ornament to the Republick, which for want of theſe things newly mention'd, and likewiſe becauſe none of the Nuncio's, during their Reſidence at *Venice*, are ever promoted to the Cardinalſhip, paſſes at *Rome* for a middle ſort of State between

tween Kings and Dukes. If theſe things could be obtain'd from a Pope that is well inclin'd to the Republick, it might not be amiſs to return the Favour, by making a Law that Eccleſiaſticks ſhould not be judged in Criminal Matters, except by the Council of Ten, or by Perſons delegated by the ſaid Council.

XXXII. *The Orders of the Council of Ten to be ſtrictly obey'd.*

Having occaſion here to ſpeak of the Authority of the Council of Ten[k], I would

[k] The *Council of Ten* was at firſt only a temporary Court of Juſtice, erected on purpoſe to make enquiry into the famous Conſpiracy of *Baiamont Tiepolo* againſt the State, when the Government of the Republick was changed into the form in which it is at preſent, and many Families excluded from the Government, who before this Change were equal Sharers in the Adminiſtration with the others. But afterwards this Council was eſtabliſh'd to be perpetual, to avoid the giving any diſguſt to the Common People, who never fail'd to murmur at the renewing of this dreadful Tribunal. For many Years after the eſtabliſhment of this Council, its Authority was confin'd within narrow bounds, becauſe the *Council of Forty for Criminal Matters*, which is of a much antienter date, judged of all Crimes, and of many other Affairs. But the Council of Ten, by their Cunning, enlarged their Authority by little and little, ſo as to aſſume to themſelves the cognizance of all Crimes againſt the State, of Seditions, of the Miſdemeanour of Magiſtrates, of falſe Coiners, of the Aſſaſſination of Nobles, of Sodomy, of Sacrilege, and ſometimes even of Hereſy,

I would recommend a ſtrict Obſervance of the Orders of the ſaid Council. And if there are any of its Orders, that, becauſe of the change of Times,

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Hereſy. Nay, they have upon ſome Occaſions extended their Power ſo far, as to repeal and annul the Decrees of the Great Council, and to conclude Leagues, Offenſive and Defenſive, without the participation of the Senate. But this they did only in certain critical Junctures, where Secrecy was of the higheſt importance, and where there was no time left for Deliberation. However, at preſent the Juriſdiction of this Council is limited wholly to Criminal Affairs, in which it judges ſoveraignly without Appeal. It is ſo ſevere and rigorous in its Proceedings, that the very Name of this Tribunal makes all the Nobility tremble for fear; and they have try'd all poſſible means to get it aboliſh'd. But all in vain, this Tribunal being look'd upon to be the Corner-ſtone of the Government, which cannot be removed without overturning the whole Foundation of the State. It is the Dread of this Tribunal alone that is capable to keep the Nobles within the bounds of their Duty. And it is firmly believ'd at *Venice*, that if ever the Council of Ten is aboliſh'd, Party and Faction, Diſcord and Sedition, will ſo prevail in the Republick, as to bring it ſoon to Ruin.

The ten Judges that ſit in this Council ought to be of ten different Families, and to have no near Relation one to another, leſt they ſhould abuſe the Power that is put into their hands. For if two or three Nobles, nearly related to one another, were capable to ſit in this Council at the ſame time, they might have it in their power to do a great deal of miſchief to

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Times, are become difficult to be put in execution, it were better for the Council to take them anew under their conſideration, and to alter in them what is inconvenient, rather than to ſuffer them to come into diſuſe by the arrogance of private Perſons. But when once any thing is decreed by the Council, it would be neceſſary to require, under the ſevereſt Penalties, a blind and implicit Obedience to be paid to it. And this would procure great Reſpect to the Council, which, being intruſted with

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the Publick; whereas ten Perſons, all of different Families, having different Views and Intereſts, will not ſo readily unite together in any Deſign againſt the State. Beſides the ten ordinary Judges, the Doge and his ſix Counſellors aſſiſt always at this Council. The Members of this Council at firſt enjoyed this Dignity only for a ſhort time, but now they continue one Year in their Office, and after an Interval of two Years they are capable of being choſen again. This Council has in the Palace of St. *Mark* a little Arſenal, wherein there are Arms for fifteen hundred Nobles, in caſe any Tumult ſhould happen in the City, while the Great Council is aſſembled. This Council of Ten has a certain number of Galleys belonging to it which are mark'd with theſe two Letters, C and X; that it may be known that they are ſolely at the diſpoſal of this Council, and that no other Magiſtrate can command them. This Council has likewiſe a certain Sum of the Publick Money depoſited in their hands, which they may diſpoſe of as they pleaſe, without being liable to give an account.

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the Exerciſe of the Regal Power, receives too great Affronts, by having its Orders ſo frequently, and ſo openly tranſgreſs'd. For that Government is in great danger, which has not, or is not willing to have, a Magiſtrate whom the Subjects are to obey without controul. And becauſe all Licentiouſneſs has its riſe among the Nobility, it would be better to allow them the uſe of ſharp Weapons in the publick Streets, and to forbid them ſeverely to carry any Fire-arms about them, which may occaſion ſome great Inconvenience. But this Cuſtom of wearing ſharp Weapons being already crept into uſe, and commonly practis'd by the Mob; the Noblemen, who pretend to diſtinguiſh themſelves from the Vulgar, uſually carry Pocket-piſtols about them. So that the only way to keep the Nobility in order, is to aboliſh intirely the Liberty uſurp'd by the Common People, and to give leave to none to carry Arms upon any pretext whatſoever, there being now no occaſion of appointing Guards for the Members of the Council of Ten, or for others, who obtain them under pretext of their being Miniſters; or if leave is granted to any to wear Arms, let it be the Sword alone. For a Government that has a numerous People,

People, and all of them arm'd, is in danger from the too great Strength of the Subjects. If this were duly conſider'd, and upon mature deliberation an Order paſt in Council to this effect, it would be no diſſervice to the Country, if a Sacrifice were made of the Lives of two of the firſt Tranſgreſſors, to teach the reſt of the Subjects to pay a dutiful Obedience to the Commands of their Superiors. It is abſolutely neceſſary to uſe the utmoſt diligence to hinder the *Avogador* from carrying the Decrees of the Council of Ten, and of the Senate, to be cenſur'd by the Great Council. If thoſe Decrees deſerve Cenſure, let the ſame Authority that eſtabliſh'd them, mitigate and modify them: For otherwiſe, if they are carried before the Great Council, they will always be repealed, to the total depreſſion of the Power of the Senators, and Exaltation of the Lower Nobility.

XXXIII. *The Members of the Council of Ten ought not to be chang'd ſo often.*

As to the Authority of the Council of Ten, I could wiſh to ſee it diſtributed with a ſcantier hand, and that not only the Dignity of the Magiſtracy were taken into conſideration, but likewiſe the Worth and Merit of the Perſons, becauſe the Authority will be always the more eſteem'd, the leſs common it is; for we know, the Rays which

which in the Sun are of Gold, when they are communicated to the Moon are only of Silver. We had certainly been much beholden to our Anceſtors, if they had fixed a longer time for the continuance of the Members of this Council, both as to the Preſident and Body of the Council. But ſince what was not done in thoſe firſt times, cannot well be effected at preſent, it would be very proper in the mean while, under pretext of not multiplying ſo many ſingular Elections, to fix the continuance of this Council for a Year, and by this means to ſecure the Members of it from thoſe frequent Elections, which are made by Scrutiny in the Senate, in which the Judges of the Councils of Forty, and other Noblemen of the ſame low Condition, have ſo great a ſhare. 'Tis true, that by this means the Members of this Council would be free from the Governments that are expenſive; but this Immunity would be of no long continuance, ſince it would expire at the Year's end. It will be objected, that this Expedient which I propoſe would raiſe too much the Authority of the Noblemen of the firſt Rank. But to this I anſwer, that this Authority cannot occaſion any great Inconvenience, ſince it continues only for

for a few Months; whereas the preſent Practice ties up the hands of thoſe Perſons who ought to have them at liberty for the diſpenſing of Juſtice, they being as it were every week in danger of being toſs'd about by the Lower Nobility, who are low in Spirit, as well as in Fortune. I have oftentimes wonder'd, that the Council of Ten, having in its hands not only the Judiciary Power in Criminal Matters, and ſome ſhare in the Adminiſtration of Civil Juſtice, but likewiſe being intruſted with the deliberative part of the Government in State Affairs, altho' in this caſe conſiſting of a greater number than uſual, becauſe of the additional Members, has ever ſuffer'd itſelf to be ſo much limited as it is; it ſeeming impoſſible to me, that at the time that this Council was firſt eſtabliſh'd, the lower Nobility could be ſo very ſtrong, as to hinder thoſe of the firſt and ſecond Rank from taking it under their Conſideration, that it is much better to be ſubject to a few Noblemen of the firſt Rank, than to many of the loweſt. However, as matters ſtand at preſent, we muſt have recourſe to the Prudence of our preſent Governours, that they may lay hold of the firſt Opportunity that offers, for ſupplying, in a ſecret

manner, and at a great diſtance, what has been neglected by our Anceſtors.

XXXIV. *Virtue to be eſteem'd in whatſoever Perſon it is found.*

Let Virtue be eſteem'd, in whatever Perſon it is found; and altho' the Perſon that is endowed with it be not Noble, yet let him be highly valued, and encouraged to live among us; for his own Merit makes him Noble ſufficiently, and all Hereditary Nobility has its riſe from ſome perſonal Virtue. If a Merchant, who brings a few periſhable Commodities into the Country, is well look'd upon, how much more does a virtuous and ingenious Man deſerve to be eſteem'd, who leaves among us a Treaſure that never periſhes? Let ſuch a Perſon as this never want any thing towards his Contentment and Satisfaction; if for no other reaſon, yet, at leaſt, that he may not lead among us the Life of a Mole, and live in perpetual Darkneſs and Obſcurity.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

The different Methods which are to be uſed in governing the ſeveral Territories belonging to the Republick.

I Come now to ſpeak to the ſecond Point, which is concerning the Government of the Territories belonging to the Republick. As to the Subjects living on the other ſide of the *Adriatick*, there is no great occaſion of much Speculation about them; becauſe they having no other Neighbours than the *Turk*, and there not being among them Perſons of great Wealth, or who have many Dependants, the Republick has nothing elſe to do, but to ſhew the Juſtneſs and Mildneſs of their Government, by a careful Choice of good Governours to be ſent them. For if thoſe People have Juſtice faithfully adminiſtred to them, and live in plenty, they will never entertain thoughts of any Change of Government. Thoſe few Subjects of *Iſtria*, and *Dalmatia*, who border upon the Empire, are in no condition to cauſe any manner of Jealouſy: And beſides, they are of themſelves very well affected to the Republick; ſo that there is no great Policy

I. *How the Subjects on the other ſide of the* Adriatick *are to be dealt with.*

licy requir'd to keep them to their Duty, the uſual manner of Government being ſufficient, without any Artifice or Cunning. There is no doubt, but greater regard is to be had to the *Greek* Subjects of the Kingdom of *Candia*, and of the Iſlands of the *Levant*, becauſe the *Grecian* Fidelity is never ſecure; and it would be no hard matter to perſuade them to exchange the Government of the Republick for that of the *Turk*, they having before their eyes the Example of the reſt of their own Nation, which live under the *Turkiſh* Dominion. Theſe People therefore ought to be kept, like wild Beaſts, with greater diligence, that they may not be able to uſe their Teeth, and their Claws, as their natural Wildneſs leads them to do. The ſureſt way of dealing with them, is to keep good Garriſons, that may hold them to their Duty, to debaſe their Spirits as much as is poſſible, and not to be fond of training them up in the Art of War, with deſign to make uſe of them in a foreign Invaſion. For they will always ſhew the greater Spite and Ill-will, the greater Force they have, being in this like to the Heat of a Fever, which is more violent in a young Man of hot Blood, than in an old Man whoſe

Blood

Blood is cooler. Theſe People are of the ſame nature with Gally-ſlaves, who, were they treated with Mildneſs and Affection, would repay the Courteſy with Sedition, and carry both the Gally and Captain into *Algier*. There is nothing for them but Food, and the Rod; and they are never to be truſted with any Authority.

II. *What Treatment the Nobility of the Colonies ought to have.*

As to the Nobility of the Colonies, they are to be lookt after with a very watchful Eye, becauſe that beſides the Wildneſs of the Climate, and the barbarous Cuſtoms they acquire in thoſe Parts, they have the Character of being Noble, which adds to their Force, and encourages their Pretenſions, as we ſee by the many Rebellions in *Candia*. The Uſe of Colonies was very profitable to the Republick of *Rome*; becauſe the People that were tranſplanted retaining, even in *Aſia* and in *Africa*, the *Roman* Temper, they never loſt, in the greateſt courſe of time, their natural Affection to their firſt Country; but poliſh'd and civiliz'd the Soil on which they were ingraffed; whereas in *Candia* the Soil has made the very Graffs themſelves become wild. If thoſe Noblemen tyrannize over the Country-peop'e, it will be fit to wink at it, that they may not live in great

Amity with one another; but if they tranſgreſs on any other occaſion, they ought to be chaſtis'd with the utmoſt ſeverity, that they may have but little reaſon to boaſt of their Privilege among the other Inhabitants. No Opportunity ought to be neglected, where there is any ſhadow of pretext for mortifying thoſe Noblemen; and if they happen in any caſe to forfeit their Nobility, they ought not to be reſtor'd to it but with great difficulty. In a word, the Republick ought to conſider, that all the good that was pretended to be reap'd by the Noblemen of the Colonies, is already obtain'd, which was the eſtabliſhing the Dominion of the Republick over thoſe Countries; ſo that for the future the Republick can expect nothing from them but Miſchief.

III. *Great Art and Cunning requir'd in governing the Subjects of the Continent.*

There is more Art and Cunning requir'd in governing thoſe Subjects that live upon the Continent; and it is fit to diſtinguiſh thoſe who out of an antient inclination are well affected to the Republick, ſuch as the *Breſcians*, *Cremasks*, *Bergamasks*, and *Vicentines*; and, as occaſion offers, to repay their Kindneſs with ſome ſecret Partiality, and to let them ſee, that the Republick knows, and highly values their hereditary Good-will. As to the other

other Subjects, which have ſome bent to the Imperial Intereſt, as thoſe of *Verona*, *Padoa*, and *Trevigio*, it is convenient to make a ſhew of adminiſtring Juſtice impartially to them, but never to let ſlip any occaſion of humbling them. The Enmities they have among themſelves ought to be wink'd at, becauſe from theſe ariſe two Benefits to the Publick, private Diſcords, and publick Confiſcations.

IV. *All Extortions upon them to be puniſh'd; but when they are tax'd by publick Authority, never to hear their Complaints againſt it.*

Let all Extortions upon the Inhabitants of the Provinces be puniſh'd with the utmoſt rigour, that the People may be induced to have a liking to the Government, becauſe of the particular Protection they receive from it. But when any Taxes, or Aids, are impoſed by publick Authority, they never ought to be heard in any Complaint againſt them. And we ought always to remember what happen'd in the Year 1606, when a League was very near being concluded between the Inhabitants of *Breſcia*, and thoſe of *Verona*, for getting the Taxes that were laid upon them to be taken off. Neither ought we ever to forget the inſolent Behaviour of the *Breſcian* Ambaſſadours at that time in the College, which differ'd very little from a ſpecious Sedition. It is fit that they know by experience, that

when once a Tax is laid upon them, there is no poſſibility of avoiding it; that ſo they may lay aſide all thoughts of attempting any eaſe in that matter. If there are any of the Members of the Councils of thoſe Provinces, who are known to be of a very reſolute Temper, or not very dutiful in obeying the publick Orders, it is fit either to ruin them entirely, or to purchaſe their Good-will, tho' to the publick Coſt; for a ſmall Maſs of Leaven is able to ferment a great quantity of Bread. It will likewiſe be convenient, as occaſion offers, to diminiſh their Privileges. The Taxes however ought not to be ſo exceſſive, as to occaſion Scarcity among them; for altho' a Man may be perſuaded to give to the Publick what he has over-much, yet he will not ſo eaſily part with what is neceſſary to his Maintenance. It would not be amiſs to learn what Taxes are laid upon the Inhabitants of the Dutchy of *Milan*, which borders upon thoſe Provinces; and to order matters ſo, as that the *Venetian* Subjects be always leſs tax'd than their Neighbours, beſides the advantage they have of being freed from Garriſons, which is one of the greateſt Oppreſſions the Subjects of any Government can be expos'd to.

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V. *None but* Breſcians *to be allowed to purchaſe Lands or Houſes in that Province.*

No Perſons ought to be allowed to purchaſe Lands or Houſes in *Breſcia*, except the Inhabitants of that Province. For if it were permitted to the *Venetians* to ſettle in that moſt fertile Country, we ſhould ſoon ſee the ſame effect in that Province, as we ſee in *Padoua*, where ſcarcely a third part of the Lands remain in the Poſſeſſion of the original Inhabitants.

VI. *The Women of great Fortunes to be married to ſome Noble* Venetian.

If it happens that there is in the Country a Lady of a great Fortune, it will be proper to try all fair, and inſinuating Means for getting her married to ſome Noble *Venetian*; and that for two Reaſons, that by this means the *Venetian* Nobility may be enriched, and the others impoveriſh'd; both which Effects are equally conducive to the Publick Good.

VII. *The Governours that are ſent thither, ought to be Men of generous Souls.*

Great care ought to be taken, that the Perſons who are ſent Governours to thoſe Provinces be Men of great and generous Souls, that the Inhabitants may not in the leaſt ſcruple to own them for Princes; for we know, that every Man believes his Eyes, more than his Ears.

VIII. *The Gentlemen of the Provinces to be employed in Countries diſtant from their*

If there offer any occaſions of employing the Gentlemen of thoſe Provinces in publick Offices, for their own private Advantage, they ought not

own. *Heads of Parties to be exterminated.* not to be neglected. But it will be convenient to employ them in Countries diſtant from their own, and for as long a time as is poſſible; that they may have the greater Difficulty, when they return to their native Country, to regain an Intereſt in it, by renewing their former Acquaintances. If there are among them any Heads of a Party, let all Occaſions be laid hold on for exterminating them, But if any ſuch are Generals in the Army, it will not be fit to condemn them to a publick Execution; it will be more prudent to employ Poiſon inſtead of a Hangman, becauſe the Advantage will be the ſame, and the Hatred the leſs.

IX. *All enormous Crimes to be carried before the Council of Ten. Sentences of Baniſhment to be rigorouſly put in Execution.* It is fit that all enormous Crimes, committed in the Provinces, be carried before the Council of Ten, becauſe a remote Power is always moſt reſpected; and then it is not ſo eaſie to ſlander Judges that live at a diſtance. If the Offenders are in the Army, let them be ſent upon Expeditions into far Countries, that their long Abſence from their native Country may ſerve as a part of their Puniſhment. If Criminals that are under Sentence of Baniſhment preſume to return to their Country, let them be proſecuted with the utmoſt Rigour; becauſe

becauſe there is no greater Demonſtration of Contempt in the Subject, and of Weakneſs in the Prince, than for a Criminal to dare to tarry within the Dominions of his Sovereign, after he has receiv'd Sentence of Baniſhment. It is the ſame height of Impudence, as if one ſhould pretend to haunt another Man's Houſe in ſpite of the Maſter.

X. *The Church Preferments of the Provinces to be left to the Natives; but none of them to be ſuffer'd to be promoted to the Cardinalſhip.*

The Biſhopricks, and Church Benefices in the Provinces, ought to be left to the Natives of each Province. For by this means the Noble *Venetians* will avoid the Accuſation of Covetouſneſs, as if they were ready to ſettle themſelves in any Country, where they can better their condition. Beſides, if theſe Church Preferments are left to the Nobility of the Provinces, it will encourage them to lead a lazy ſlothful Life; and the proſpect of getting a Livelihood eaſily this way, will divert them from the thoughts of making their Fortune by the War; ſo that it will be convenient to let them enjoy this Shadow of Liberty in their State of Bondage. But as it is profitable, on the one hand, for the Republick to have the Natives of the Provinces advanced to Biſhopricks; ſo, on the other hand, it is no leſs prejudicial to ſuffer them to be promoted to the Cardinalſhip; and therefore all poſſible

ſible ways are to be uſed to hinder it, becauſe they will diſdain the Quality of a Subject, when they are once raiſed to the Purple Dignity, which has uſup'd the Precedency of the Doge himſelf.

XI. *The Provinces to be allowed to confer their Nobility on ſuch Perſons as they pleaſe. The Families that take Service under other Princes to be diſcouraged.*

Every Province ought to be allowed to diſpenſe its own Nobility to ſuch as the Council of the Province approves of, that a Door may be left open for the debaſing it by the Numbers that are aggregated; but it is fit that the Perſons who are dignified with the Nobility, be obliged to ask a Confirmation of it from the Senate. Care muſt be taken to diſcourage, upon all occaſions, thoſe Families that have any of their Deſcendants engaged in the Service of other Princes; and the Government, by diſcountenancing them, ought to give them this private Intimation, That he deſerves but little at the Hands of his own Sovereign, who attempts to make his Fortune under another Prince.

XII. *If any Nobleman of the Provinces quarrels with a Noble* Venetian *in* Venice, *he ought to be puniſh'd ſeverely; but if the Quarrel falls out in the Provinces, then it is fit to deal more gently with him.*

If any Gentleman of the Provinces happens to have a Quarrel with any Noble *Venetian* at *Venice*, it will be fit to reſent the Affront publickly, and with Rigour, if the Country Gentleman is in the wrong. But if the Quarrel happens in the Province to which the Gentleman belongs, there it

it will be prudent to deal a little more gently with him, unleſs he has offer'd ſome very great Violence to the *Venetian* Nobleman; that the Subjects of the Provinces may be ſenſible, that they live under the Government of a Prince of an unbiaſs'd Juſtice; and that the Noble *Venetians* may avoid the having any Quarrels in the Provinces, when they ſee the Government diſpoſed to protect the Nobility of thoſe Countries.

XIII. *Cittadels ſerve as Bulwarks againſt a foreign Enemy; and keep the rebellious Citizens in awe.*

The Cittadels of the moſt conſiderable Cities ought to be kept in good Repair, and well provided with every thing neceſſary, that they may not only ſerve as Bulwarks to the State againſt the Incurſions of a foreign Enemy, but that they may likewiſe keep in awe the contumacious Citizens. There is nothing encourages Criminals more, than the hopes of avoiding the Puniſhment due to their Crime. For if an Offender were perſuaded that he had no way left him to eſcape from the Hands of Juſtice, he would never offend; and that Prince is ſufficiently guarded, who is believed to be able to revenge himſelf of any Injury that is done him. It is fit always to remember, that as it is a hard matter to meet with a Monk, or a married Woman, who has not ſome time or other repented

repented the diveſting themſelves of the Free-will which they had from their Birth; ſo it is no leſs difficult a thing to find a People, that is not ſorry for having ſubjected themſelves to the power of others, ſince Nature at firſt made them free.

CHAP. III.

What Regards the Republick ought to have in its Treaties with other Princes.

I. *The Pope conſider'd in his Spiritual Capacity.*

IN ſpeaking to this third Point, concerning the Intereſt of the Republick with reſpect to other Princes, I ſhall begin with the Pope, who is the firſt in Dignity, altho' not in Power. He is to be conſider'd under a double Capacity, as he is a Spiritual Prince, and as he is a Temporal Monarch. As to the Pope's Spiritual Dominion, I have already given ſome Cautions about it, and ſhall here ſubjoin what is wanting. I cannot here forbear remarking the wonderful Proſperity of that Monarchy, which from a miſerable perſecuted State, when the firſt Chri-

Chriſtians could not aſſemble together to perform their Devotions but by Stealth, and when they were forced to purchaſe the Exerciſe of their Religion with the Blood of their Martyrs, is now advanced to ſuch a pitch of Greatneſs, that all Kings and Princes pay Homage to the Biſhop of *Rome*, with Adoration, and with kiſſing his Toe. God has been pleas'd in this manner to make known the Reward which attends the Chriſtian Religion, by raiſing to the higheſt degree of Grandeur thoſe Perſons that are the Founders and Teachers of it; but the Piety of Princes has not a little contributed towards it, and among them *Conſtantine* was the firſt Benefactor. This Prince not only embraced the Chriſtian Faith, but gave Peace to the Church, and endowed it with Revenues; and after him all the Emperors and Kings one after another ſtrove who ſhould give moſt to the Church. But it is a thing altogether unaccountable, how, beſides the Reverence and Reſpect they paid to the Biſhop of *Rome*, they came to be prevail'd with to yield up the Juriſdiction and Power they had over him. For the Space of ſix hundred Years after the Birth of our Saviour, the Pope was confirm'd by the Emperors,

and,

and, in their Abſence, by their Exarchs; and in thoſe Days, the Date of the Bulls of the Popes run in this manner, *In the Reign of ſuch a one our Sovereign Lord*, The Emperor *Juſtinian*, in the Year 518, ſent from *Conſtantinople* his Ambaſſadors to Pope *Celius Hormiſda*, that they might confirm the Authority of the Apoſtolick See, and proclaim Peace to the Church. In the Year 584, *Conſtantine* the Second granted to Pope *Benedict* II. that for the future the Election of the Pope ſhould be made by the Clergy, and People of *Rome*, without any Confirmation from the Emperor, or the Exarch; and this he did without conſidering that the Holineſs of thoſe times might be converted into political Intereſt. Afterwards *Boniface* the Third obtain'd from *Phocas* the Emperor, that all the Churches ſhould pay Obedience to the Church of *Rome*. Then in the Year 708 *Juſtin* the Second was the firſt that kiſs'd the Toe of Pope *Conſtantine*. But in Recompence of Favours received from the Kings of *France*, Pope *Adrian* the Firſt, in a Council of a hundred and fifty three Biſhops, gave to *Charles* the Firſt, King of *France*, who was afterwards called *Charles the Great*, Power to chuſe the Pope. This was

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in the Year 773. However, *Lewis* the Godly did not long keep this Grant, which his Father had obtain'd from the Pope; he having exchanged this Regal Authority with the imaginary Title of *Godly*; to which we may join that of *Simple*.

II. *About what time the Popes began first to excommunicate the Emperors.*

How ſcandalous ſoever the Emperors of thoſe Days were in their Lives, yet the Popes thought fit to connive at their Licentiouſneſs, and to leave them to be puniſh'd by the Hand of God. But in the Year 713, *Philip Bardanes* the Emperor, having fallen into Hereſie, reap'd the Reward of the Honours and Privileges which his Predeceſſors had granted to the Popes, he having been excommunicated by Pope *Conſtantine*; and this was the firſt time that the Imperial Authority was made ſubject to the Pontifical. The Church of *Milan* would not own any Dependence on the Church of *Rome*, and for two hundred Years aſſerted its Liberty, as being the Church that was honour'd with the Preſence of the Emperor, when he was in *Italy*, and perpetually with the Reſidence of the Exarch in the Emperor's Abſence. But at laſt in the Year 1057, the Church of *Milan* yielded up its Pretenſions to Pope *Stephen* the IXth, who was elected by the Cardinals,

excluſively of the People. I have been the more full in relating all theſe Particulars, that it may appear in what manner this ſpiritual Monarchy has by degrees riſen to its preſent pitch of Greatneſs, to which the good Nature of Princes has contributed no leſs, than the Cunning of the Popes, in improving all Opportunities to the Advancement of their own Power.

III. *The Emperors are now choſen by the Pontifical Authority; the Electors of the Empire deriving their Power of Election from the Popes.*

At preſent the Emperor is choſe by the Pontifical Authority, by virtue of a Bull of Pope *Gregory*, which gives the Right of Election to the Eccleſiaſtical and Secular Electors of the Empire, and obliges the Emperor Elect to be confirm'd, and crown'd by the Pope. So that the Subject is now become Sovereign over his own Prince, to the great Diſcredit of *Otho* the Emperor, who in the Year 994 granted to the Pope this Power of Election, as an Ornament, as he pretended, to the *German* Nation; but he thereby greatly impair'd the Authority of the Emperor, and deſtroyed intirely the hereditary Right of Succeſſion, and put his Succeſſors under an Obligation of being elected. The Pope having in this manner made himſelf free, ſoon after brought all the other Biſhops into Subjection, and got himſelf to be own'd as the firſt in Dignity,

Dignity, and Juriſdiction, preferably to the other four Patriarchs, of *Antioch*, *Alexandria*, *Conſtantinople*, and *Jeruſalem*. This over-ruling Star ought therefore to ſerve as a Warning to all well govern'd States, that they may narrowly watch all Occaſions, in which the Papal Authority dilates it ſelf, altho' inſenſibly; becauſe every Favour of the Prince, in proceſs of a few Years, will be conſtrued as a Debt; and the Popes, to maintain themſelves in Poſſeſſion, will not fail to fulminate Anathemas and Excommunications againſt all that oppoſe them.

IV. *The Popes claim a Power of depoſing Kings, and erecting Kingdoms.*

It is a matter worthy of great Conſideration, the Cuſtom, or rather Abuſe, that has crept in among us, of the Popes having a Power to depoſe Kings, and to give away their Kingdoms to others, under pretext of their having govern'd them ill. The prodigal Son in the Goſpel did not loſe his Right to the Share he had by Law in his Father's Eſtate, altho' he did what he could to diſſipate it; becauſe the right which one has to a thing by Nature, is never ſeparated from him in his Life time, unleſs by a Fiction of the Law. The Kings of *Navarre* were ſent a wandering over the World by a Scroll of Parchment, which was the Bull of *Julius* IId, by which he

excommunicated King *John*, and made over his Kingdom to the firſt Poſſeſſor. And were it not that Providence reſerved for them the Succeſſion to the Crown of *France*, there would not at this time be ſo much as mention made of a King of *Navarre*. Beſides the Right which the Popes claim of taking away Kingdoms, they pretend likewiſe to a Power of erecting them; as *Paul* IV. pretended to make *Ireland* a Kingdom, and *Pius* V. to erect *Toſcany* into a Great Dutchy, and to deprive Queen *Elizabeth* of the Kingdom of *England*. *Philip* II. King of *Spain*, according to the Cuſtom of his Anceſtors, undertook to be Executioner of the Pope's Sentence, and for that end took the Field; but he ſoon found that he had to encounter as Enemies, Heaven, the Elements, and the Arms of *England*; ſo that the long Suſpenſion which this Sentence has met with, may tempt us to believe that it will at this time prove ineffectual.

V. France *would never acknowledge this depoſing Power*; England, *on the contrary, has ſeveral times made it ſelf tributary to the Popes.*

In *France*, whether it is becauſe of the Privilege of the *Gallican* Church, or becauſe of the lively Temper of the People, they do not admit of any Bulls which concern State-deprivation; both becauſe they neither allow the Pope's Deprivation, nor the Right

of

of Occupation after it; but maintain the Right of Succeſſion, or Election, to the Perſons to whom it belongs. And in effect, to deprive the reigning Prince, and to give away his Kingdom to the firſt Poſſeſſor, is not only to puniſh the ſuppoſed Delinquent, but at the ſame time to chaſtiſe the innocent Succeſſor, or Elector. The Kingdom of *England* has taken quite another courſe in this matter than that of *France*, it having thought fit ſeveral times to make it ſelf tributary to the See of *Rome*, by paying a hundred Marks of Gold, which is call'd *Peter-pence*. The firſt time was in the Pontificate of *Leo* IV. The ſecond was in the Year 1214, to avert the Invaſion they were threaten'd with from *France*. But *Henry* VIII. has once for all redeem'd the Nation from this Bondage, and reſtor'd both himſelf and his Subjects to the Poſſeſſion of their antient natural Rights.

VI. *The Difference between Pope* Paul V. *and the Republick of* Venice.

We have a Home-example in *Paul* V. of the Charity of the Popes, in taking upon them to govern their Neighbour's Houſe, under Pretext that the Maſter does not govern it aright. But the Firmneſs and Reſolution which the Republick ſhewed on that occaſion, will make the Court of *Rome* more wary for the future, how they

intrude themſelves into other Peoples Concerns; they having been forced to come to an Accommodation, which was not much for their Credit, they having tacitly yielded up their Pretenſions. For to ask a thing, and not to obtain it, is a ſign that the Demand is not well grounded. The Refuſal of the Abſolution, is a certain Proof that the Excommunication was not valid; ſo that the Diſpute which the Republick had with that Pope, has been more beneficial than prejudicial to the State; in the ſame manner as a little Diſorder in ones Stomach, when it is conquer'd, contributes to the Health of the Perſon. If ever the Republick ſhould hereafter be put under Interdiction, which I hope will never happen, it will be proper to cauſe to be affixed in *Rome* an Appeal to the firſt General Council, which would occaſion a great Alarm at the Court. For ſuch an Appeal produces two conſiderable Effects; firſt, it revives the Memory of a Council, and makes them believe there are ſtill Perſons who entertain hopes of ſeeing one aſſembled; and then it inſinuates the Superiority of a Council to the Pope, which is a point that gives the greateſt Jealouſie to thoſe that ſtickle moſt for the Pope's Authority.

The

VII. *The Republick never much favour'd by the Popes, and therefore has the more reaſon to watch narrowly over all their Motions.*

The Republick, by examining carefully every Bull that comes from *Rome*, and by continuing to obſerve the things that have been practis'd hitherto, may hope not to be brought under greater Subjection than other Princes; nay, to enjoy ſome more Liberty than others do, eſpecially the *Spaniards*, to whom it turns to account to bear patiently with the Tyranny of the Court of *Rome*, becauſe they receive from thence conſiderable Benefits, and then they value themſelves on their being zealous Defenders of the Pope's Authority. In effect, the Popes have never ſhewn any great Favour to the Republick, except in the Privilege which *Alexander* III. granted, with the Honours of the Staff of Command, the Umbrello, and the Standards, which ſerve rather as a remembrance of that illuſtrious Action, than that they have in themſelves Qualities, which the Doge might not have aſſumed of his own accord, without any ſuch Grant from the Pope. If we except the Grant of the Tenths of the Clergy, and the Right of Nomination to the Biſhopricks, this Republick has but very little experimented the Liberality of the Popes. So that this may ſerve as an Excuſe, if the Republick retain to it ſelf the Cog-

nizance of all Cauſes concerning Church Benefices, and if, upon occaſion, it minds its own Intereſt, without having any great regard to Complement. I ſhall ſay no more of the Pope's Spiritual Capacity, but proceed in the next place to conſider him as a Temporal Prince.

VIII. *The Pope conſider'd as a Temporal Prince.*

In examining the Secular State of the Church of *Rome*, I ſhall conſider theſe five Particulars, which ſhall ſerve as a Rule in the Enquiry I am to make into the State of other Princes.

Firſt, Whether it is for the Intereſt of the Republick, that the Church increaſe its Territories?

Secondly, What Pretence of Right, what Inclination, and Conveniency the Pope may have to poſſeſs himſelf of any part of the Territories belonging to the Republick?

Thirdly, What pretence of Right, Conveniency, and Inclination the Republick may have to ſeize upon any part of the Territories belonging to the Church?

Fourthly, Whether the Church may probably enter into a League with the Republick, to ſeize upon the Dominions of other Princes?

Fifthly, Whether the Church may enter into a League with other Princes,

ces, to ſtop the Progreſs of the Republick?

To the *Firſt* of theſe Queſtions I may return a general Anſwer, That it is never the Intereſt of a Prince, who is any way conſiderable for his Power and Strength, and who has a mind to maintain himſelf free and independent by his own Force, that any other Prince ſhould increaſe in Power, except it be by leſſening the Dominions of a third Prince, who is more powerful than either of them. And if the Prince who attempts to enlarge his Territories be a Neighbour, there is ſtill the greater reaſon to be afraid of his Advancement. Theſe Changes are convenient for a Prince that is weak and inconſiderable, and who, for that reaſon, is not unwilling to have a Dependence on the Prince who increaſes his Dominions, hoping to receive from him the Benefit of Protection againſt other Princes, who would oppreſs him. But to give a more particular Anſwer to this Queſtion. If the Church ſhould get Poſſeſſion of any of the Dominions in *Italy* belonging to the King of *Spain*, who is the firſt Potentate of *Italy*, it would not be diſlik'd by the Republick of *Venice*, which is the ſecond Sovereign State, becauſe by this means it

IX. *Whether it is for the Intereſt of the Republick, that the Church of* Rome *increaſe its Territories?*

it might come to be the firſt. And the Forces of the Church would always give leſs Jealouſie than thoſe of *Spain*, becauſe of the condition of the Principality, which is Elective, and Temporary, and which changes its Views, and its Inclination, according to the Vacancies of the See; whereas the Monarchy of *Spain* is Hereditary, and Perpetual, and is always govern'd by the ſame Maxims. But if the Church ſhould increaſe its Dominions with the Spoils of any *Italian* Prince, it would then be the Intereſt of the Republick to oppoſe any ſuch Advancement, becauſe the Damage, and Danger of it is evident, and it is impoſſible that any manner of good could accrue thereby. It is fit to conſider, to what degree the Church has increas'd its Dominions this laſt Age. The antient Cuſtom of giving away the Lands of the Church in Fees, and the great Facility with which they were obtain'd, had reduced the Church to ſuch a poor condition, that it was become a Sovereign State in appearance, more than in reality, in ſhew, more than Subſtance. But Pope *Julius* the IId, who ſucceeded to *Alexander* VI, took from Duke *Valentino* all that he had taken by force from a great many petty Tyrants.

So

So that in a little time the Church had, by this means, *Bolonia*, *Romagna*, (which was to the detriment of the Republick, becauſe of *Cervia*, *Rimini*, *Ravenna*, *Faenza*, *Imola*, and other Towns) and afterwards the Dutchy of *Ferrara* under *Clement* VIII, and then laſt of all the Dutchy of *Urbino*; which States alone, without any addition, are able to make a conſiderable Principality. There remains nothing for the Church to acquire in *Italy*, except *Parma*, and *Piacenza*, and ſome little inconſiderable Caſtles about *Rome*. So that the Church in its preſent State and Condition, and by the diſuſe of alienating the Lands that belong to it, is become very conſiderable for its Temporal Dominion; and to ſuch a degree, that a farther Enlargement of its Territories would give jealouſy, and might prove of dangerous conſequence to every Prince in *Italy*. Wherefore I don't believe it is neceſſary to bring any other Reaſon to enforce this Point, that it is not for the Intereſt of the Republick, that the Church increaſe its Dominion in Temporals.

X. *What Pretence of Right, what Inclination and Conveniency, the*

As to the ſecond point, concerning the Pretence of Right, the Inclination, and Conveniency, the Pope may have to poſſeſs himſelf of any part of the

the Pope may have to poſſeſs himſelf of any part of the Territories belonging to the Republick?

the Territories belonging to the Republick. To this I anſwer, that the Court of *Rome* profeſſing the higheſt Juſtice, (altho' the Juſtice of Princes is always more in outward ſhew, than in reality, and deſign'd only to diſcountenance Uſurpation in other Princes) I can hardly believe the Pope will claim a Right to any of the Territories of the Republick, except it be the *Poleſine di Rouigo*, which was annex'd to the Republick in the time of the Dukes of *Ferrara*. And I don't queſtion but the Popes would be very ready to revive their Pretenſions to this, if they had any hopes of Succeſs; conſidering that in times paſt they appear'd always moſt zealous Defenders of the Dukes of *Ferrara* againſt the Republick. The Popes put out no leſs than four Bulls of Excommunication againſt the Republick on this occaſion. The firſt was in the Year 1306, by *Clement* V. becauſe of the Republick's invading the Territories of *Ferrara*. The ſecond was in the Year 1483, in the Pontificate of *Sixtus* IV, when the Republick beſieged and took *Ferrara*, at the Inſtigation of the ſaid Pope. But the Pope having afterwards made peace with the Duke, fulminated an Excommunication againſt the Republick, becauſe

cauſe they refuſed to give back what they had poſſeſs'd themſelves of by the Law of War. However, a Peace was concluded the Year following, by which the *Venetians* remain'd Maſters of the *Poleſine di Rouigo*. The third Excommunication was in the Year 1505, under *Julius* the II, becauſe of the Republick's ſeizing upon the Cities of *Romagna*. And the laſt and moſt recent of all, was in the time of *Paul* V. Since the Popes intereſted themſelves ſo much in this matter, when the Loſs fell immediately on the Dukes of *Ferrara*, it is not to be doubted but they would eſpouſe the ſame Intereſt at preſent, when the Advantage would accrue immediately to themſelves. So that we have good ground to believe, that the Popes ſtill claim a Right to this part of the Territories of the Republick, and that they do not want Inclination to aſſert it, whenever they ſee a favourable Opportunity. The next thing we are to do, is to enquire what Conveniency the Popes have for recovering this Territory to which they claim a Right. And as to this, I am perſuaded that of themſelves they would never be able to do it, and that they will never attempt it by their own Force; and unleſs they warm themſelves

ſelves at other People's Fire, as happen'd under Pope *Julius*, they will never have heat enough to be able to march over that marſhy Country. But if they weigh'd well the true and ſolid Reaſon of the Liberty of *Italy*, they would never, in hopes of this little Gain, enter into a League againſt the Republick of *Venice*. Becauſe it is the Intereſt of *Italy* not to weaken its moſt powerful Princes, but rather to contribute to their Greatneſs, that, in caſe of any Invaſion from beyond the *Alps*, they may be the better able to defend the Country. But the ſame Reaſon was as ſtrong againſt Pope *Julius*, and yet when it came in competition with his particular Intereſt, it had no manner of Influence on him. So that we are not to hope for greater Prudence in theſe latter times, than what we have ſeen in former Ages; and therefore have reaſon to conclude, that if any powerful foreign Prince ſhould offer to reſtore to the Church this Portion of the Territories of the Republick, the Popes would make no manner of ſcruple to embrace it.

XI. *What Pretence of Right, what Conveniency, and Inclination the Republick may have to ſeize*

The third Doubt is, what Pretence of Right, Conveniency, and Inclination the Republick may have to ſeize upon any part of the Territories belonging to the Church? To this I reply

ply, that the Republick may have very good reaſon to attempt the Recovery of the[a] Territory it loſt by the Battle of *Ghiara d'Adda*; a Territory which the Republick had not uſurp'd from the Church, but had acquir'd by the voluntary Surrender of the People, or by Conqueſt from thoſe petty Tyrants, who in the paſt Ages took advantage of the Negligence of the Popes, and of the ſlothful lazy Temper of the *Italians*, who ſubmitted their Necks tamely to the Yoke of every little Tyrant that had a mind to govern them. That Territory was loſt, or rather, to ſpeak more properly, yielded up, to prevent any more Fewel from being added to the vaſt Fire that was kindled againſt the Republick by all the Chriſtian Princes in the League of *Cambray*. There is no manner of doubt, were the Circumſtances of time favourable, that the Republick would have a very lawful and juſt Pretext for recovering

ſeize upon any part of the Territories belonging to the Church?

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[a] By the Territory here mention'd, Father *Paul* means the Towns of *Ravenna*, *Faenza*, *Imola*, *Cervia*, and other Places in the Country of *Romagna*, which, after the Defeat of the *Venetian* Army at *Ghiara d'Adda*, ſurrender'd themſelves to the Arms of Pope *Julius* the 2d. *Guicciard. Hiſt. d'Italia. lib.* 8.

this

this Country. And I am apt likewiſe to think, that there would be no want of inclination in them to do it, ſince the deſire of Dominion is as natural to Princes, as the deſire of Meat is to a living Man. The only point is in the Conveniency the Republick might have for executing its Deſigns; and here I find it would be entirely at a loſs. For there is no Prince; but who would, either out of a real Obſervance, or at leaſt a ſhew of Religion, oppoſe the bereaving the Church of any of its Dominions. And ſince there is no Prince of *Italy* ſo powerful, as to bid defiance to all the other Princes, when their Forces are united together, and who would attempt to do himſelf Juſtice by the Strength of his own Arm, it is to no purpoſe to expect to ſee the Dominions of the Church any way leſſen'd.

XII. *Whether the Church may probably enter into a League with the Republick to ſeize upon the Dominions of other Princes?*

The fourth Queſtion is, whether the Church may probably enter into a League with the Republick, to ſeize upon the Dominions of other Princes? To this I anſwer negatively, it not being probable that the Church and the Republick can ever unite together to make Conqueſts upon other Princes. If the Country to be conquer'd were ſuch as the Church had any Pretenſions to, then it would readily join with

with the Republick to conquer it upon its own account, but not to divide it; ſo that what would be pleaſing to the Pope in this caſe, would not be ſo very acceptable to the Republick. And it is not very likely that the Church will ever join in conquering a Country to which it has no manner of Claim, ſince it would be no Gainer by ſuch a Conqueſt; and I can hardly think, that, to make it ſelf a Gainer by the War, it would attempt to rob the Republick of any of its Territories. To this we ought to add the conſideration of the Temper and Inclination of the Popes, who, for the moſt part, have no other Deſire than to maintain the Dominions of the Church in the ſame condition they found them, and to preſerve to themſelves the univerſal Reſpect of the Princes. Beſides, in the declining Age in which the Popes are uſually advanced to the Papacy, they have only private thoughts of raiſing their own Families, and think but little of enlarging their Dominions; they ſeeing that they can have but a very ſhort time to enjoy them, and that they would be obliged to lay out vaſt Sums of Money on ſuch Conqueſts; which would otherwiſe remain in their own Pockets, and ſerve to enrich their

neareſt Relations. The Temper of Pope *Julius* II. was fatal to all *Italy*, but more eſpecially to the Republick of *Venice*, he having been the chief Inſtrument in concerting the League of *Cambray*. However, it cannot be denied, that for one born in a mean Condition, he had a moſt noble publick Spirit; he did not amuſe himſelf with enriching his own Family, and claim'd no other ſhare in his Conqueſts, than the bare Applauſe of the Court.

XIII. *Whether the Church may enter into a League with other Princes, to ſtop the Progreſs of the Republick?*

The fifth and laſt Point propos'd to be conſider'd, is, whether the Church may enter into a League with other Princes, to ſtop the Progreſs of the Republick? This Queſtion depends, in a great meaſure, on the former. And I don't believe it will be an eaſy matter, to get the Pope to join with other Princes in ſeizing upon any of the Territories belonging to the Republick. For to encreaſe the Power of that other Prince with whom the Alliance is to be made, would be no manner of advantage to the Church. And for the Church to take to her ſelf the Spoils of the War, it would not ſuit very well with the ſtrict Juſtice ſhe profeſſes; unleſs the Conqueſt were ſome Country to which ſhe claims a Right, as has been already ſaid. 'Tis true

true, ſhould any of thoſe terrible Excommunications be fulminated, by which Princes are diveſted of their Dominions, and their Right transferred to the firſt Poſſeſſor, this being an univerſal Warrant for every body, might likewiſe ſerve for the Church, to ſeize upon the Dominions of the Prince that is excommunicated. But matters are never puſh'd to this extremity, except when the Prince is a violent Perſecutor of the Church; a thing never to be dreaded from the Republick, which has always been ſo exemplary in Piety and Religion. There is no manner of doubt, but an Alliance might be eaſily fram'd between the Pope and another Prince, to ſtop the Progreſs of the Arms of the Republick, if they were turn'd againſt a Prince who has a Dependence on the Church. Nay, altho' the Prince attack'd by the Republick could lay no claim to the Protection of the Church; yet if he were a weak poor Prince, the Pope might readily be induced to enter into a League for his defence, under the colour of Juſtice, in protecting the weaker from being oppreſs'd. But if it were a ſtrong powerful Prince, with whom the Republick were ingaged in War, one who is not united to the Church

by any antient League or Alliance, I am apt to think, that, whatever Advantages the Republick might have in the War, the Pope would remain neuter, and not concern himſelf in the matter; it being more for the Intereſt of the Court of *Rome* to leſſen the Power and Strength of that great Prince, than to keep the Republick under, which gives leſs Jealouſy to the Court of *Rome*, in as much as it has no manner of pretence to thoſe antient tickliſh Claims, which ſome other Princes might be apt to revive. And this ſhall ſuffice as to the Enquiry into the Intereſt of the Republick with reſpect to the Court of *Rome*.

XIV. *Whether it is for the Intereſt of the Republick, that the Emperor enlarge his Dominions?*

I ſhall in the next place proceed to examine the Political Intereſts that are between the Emperor and the Republick. And here the Republick ought not to forget That grand Reaſon which all Princes have to oppoſe the growth of the Empire, leſt it ſhould revive its antient Claims and Pretenſions, and eſpecially in *Italy*. The Dominion of the Commonwealth of *Rome*, which gave Law to almoſt all the known World, and which by the Fortune and Valour of *Julius Cæſar*, was afterwards transferred upon him and his Succeſſors, might give a colourable Pretext to the Emperor,

to

to call all Sovereigns to a new account; and many who wear now a Crown, might perhaps be reduced to return to the Plough, if their Cauſe were to be decided in the open Field, and Sentence pronounced by the Mouth of Cannon. It is therefore the Intereſt of all Princes, that the Emperor keep himſelf within the bounds of his *Germany*, where the Cold may benumn his Members, and diſable him from giving diſturbance to his Neighbours. It is to be conſider'd, that the Republick has reaſon to ſuſpect the Emperor on many Heads. As Emperor, becauſe of the Dutchy of *Friuli*, and the *Marca Trivigiana*, under which Country is included, according to the antient Geography, beſides *Trevigi*, likewiſe *Padoua*, *Vicenza*, and *Verona*. As Arch-Duke of *Auſtria*, he is to be ſuſpected, becauſe of his Pretenſions to the Country of *Iſtria*; and as King of *Hungary*, becauſe of *Zara*, and the adjacent Country. So that the Republick has great reaſon to be jealous of the Emperor, both becauſe of his great Pretenſions, and likewiſe becauſe of his nearneſs to their Confines. All theſe Countries are much antienter than the City of *Venice*; ſo that they being in ſubjection to a

Metropolitan City of a much freſher Date than themſelves, it would give occaſion to call in doubt the Lawfulneſs of the Title; and the rather, becauſe theſe Claims that lay buried in Antiquity, have been ſufficiently reviv'd by the League of *Cambray*, I ſay, therefore, without any manner of Heſitation, that it is the Intereſt of the Republick that the Empire be kept low, both upon the general account of the Peace and Quiet of *Europe*, and likewiſe becauſe of its own particular Concern.

XV. *What Pretence of Right, what Inclination, and Conveniency, the Emperor may have to ſeize upon any of the Territories belonging to the Republick?*

From theſe Conſiderations it is eaſie to gather, that the Emperor neither wants Pretences, nor Inclination, to ſeize upon ſome of the Territories belonging to the Republick. And this Inclination has been nouriſh'd in him by the antient Claims of his Predeceſſors, and by the little Reſpect he pretends was paid him by the Republick in the time of his Diſaſters, when they built the Fort of *Palma* under his Noſe. All this will eaſily admit of Belief. It remains therefore to be enquir'd into, what Conveniency the Emperor has to aſſert his Claim. As matters ſtand at preſent, while the Emperor is overpower'd by the Hereticks, I do not believe that he, upon his own Bottom alone, would willingly engage himſelf

himſelf in a War with the Republick, which is as powerful in Money, as the Emperor is in Men; but at the long run, whoever has Money, may have Men; and whoever has Men, muſt ſpend his Money. 'Tis true, that the Emperor's Country bordering on the Territories of the Republick, would add to his Force, becauſe a leſſer number of Men would be requiſite for an Invaſion. However, unleſs the War were denounced in the Name of the Empire, in which caſe all the *German* Nation would perhaps concur, and then the Emperor would have his Army paid for ſome time; I am apt to believe, that the Emperor by himſelf, and only with his Patrimonial Territories, would not be able to make any great Progreſs againſt the Republick. And what confirms me the more in this Belief, is, becauſe a great many Heretical Princes, and Free Cities in *Germany* are engaged, for their particular Intereſts, to oppoſe the Emperor's Greatneſs. The Emperor, 'tis true, by his nearneſs to our Confines, has the Conveniency of making an Incurſion into the Territories of the Republick whenever he pleaſes; but then he has not wherewithal to maintain a long War. This was the true Cauſe of building the Fort

of *Palma*, that it might ſerve as a Bulwark againſt Invaſions, by giving Shelter to the Country People, and by ſtopping the Fury of the Enemy at leaſt for ſome time; which Interruption of their Progreſs is no leſs advantageous to the Republick, than it is noxious to the Invader. So that the Emperor, unleſs he have Supplies of Money from ſome other State, will be able to make but ſmall Progreſs in a War againſt the Republick, let him have never ſo numerous an Army. We may remember what happen'd in the time of the Emperor *Maximilian*, who, before the Siege of *Padoua*, appear'd with an Army, which was then in the Pay of the Republick; and ſoon after declaring War againſt the Republick, he inveſted *Padoua* with Forty thouſand fighting Men; but the Siege laſted only forty Days, and at laſt he was forced to raiſe it without any Succeſs. I am perſuaded therefore, that it will be no eaſie matter for the Emperor to recover any of the Countries that are in the Hands of the Republick, both becauſe of the Difficulty of the Enterprize, as alſo becauſe of the Jealouſie the Emperor may conceive, leſt, when he is engaged in a War with the Republick, thoſe *German* Princes, who are as much

much divided from him in Inclination, as they are in Faith, ſhould lay hold on that Opportunity for making Innovations in the vital Parts of the Empire.

XVI. *What Pretence of Right, what Inclination, and Conveniency, the Republick may have to ſeize on any part of the Emperor's Country?*

Let us, in the next place, enquire, what pretence of Right, what Inclination, and Conveniency, the Republick may have to ſeize on any part of the Emperor's Country. There is no doubt, but the Republick might put in its Claim to *Goritia* and *Gradiſca*, which formerly belonged to the Family of the *Frangipani*, and was heretofore under the Dominion of the Republick, altho' but for a ſhort while; and likewiſe to ſome Caſtles in *Iſtria*, and to *Trieſte* on the Seacoaſt. And I believe likewiſe, there is no want of Inclination in the Republick to recover theſe places; ſince Diſintereſſedneſs, which is applauded as a generous Virtue in private Perſons, is cenſur'd as a Defect in Princes. But the main Point lies always in the Conveniency of recovering what we pretend to be our Right; for whoever has that, is more than half way advanced towards the obtaining of Juſtice; and on the other hand, it is Prudence not to inſiſt on our Right, when we have not the Conveniency of doing our ſelves Juſtice. Now I don't

don't ſee the Republick has this Conveniency, of regaining thoſe Places it claims a Right to; becauſe to attack the Country, the Republick would be obliged to make vaſt Preparations; I mean to attack the Inland Country. For as to *Trieſte*, which lies on the Sea-coaſt, it would be as eaſie a matter to take it, as it would be difficult to keep it. Then again on the Emperor's ſide, the Defence would be both vigorous and ready, he being able, in an inſtant, to raiſe a numerous Army for the Defence of his Country: So that it would be to no purpoſe to think of making a Conqueſt this way, unleſs the War were begun by ſome other Prince. Then indeed it would not be improper for the Republick to lay hold of that Opportunity for recovering its Right, that by the means of a Peace, which, ſooner or later, is the end of every War, that Country which the Republick claims a Right to in the Empire, or at leaſt a part of it, may remain to the Republick by Agreement, as a Compenſation for the Charges it has been at in the War, and the other Damages it has ſuſtain'd. In a word, for the Republick to enter into a War barely for the Recovery of thoſe Places it pretends a Right to in *Germany*, would

be

be a Deliberation no ways ſuitable to the Prudence, and Maturity of the *Venetian* Counſels. It were much better to wait for an Opportunity of the Emperor's being in great Straits for want of Money, which happens very often, and then to purchaſe thoſe Places with ready Money, and let them coſt never ſo great Sums, the Money would be well ſpent. But in caſe of a Purchaſe, thoſe Places not being a part of the Emperor's Patrimonial State, it would be neceſſary to have the Sale ratified by the Princes of the Empire, that they may have no ground to renew a Claim hereafter.

XVII. *Whether the Emperor may probably enter into a League with the Republick, to ſeize upon the Dominions of other Princes?*

That the Emperor ſhould enter into an Alliance with the Republick, for conquering the Dominions of other Princes, is what cannot readily happen here in *Italy*. For the Emperor will never unite againſt *Spain*; neither will he readily enter into a League againſt the Church, he ſetting up to be the Church's Advocate. Then as to the leſſer Princes of *Italy*. *Modena*, *Mantoua*, and *Mirandola*, are Fees of the Empire. *Savoy* and *Florence* are at a great diſtance, ſo that there is no getting at their Dominions without paſſing over the Territories of greater Princes which lie in the way. And therefore this Union ſeems

to,

to be altogether impoſſible, what with the Difficulty of it in ſome Caſes, and the want of Will in others. If the Emperor ſhould happen to quarrel with any of the Dukes his Vaſſals, and ſhould declare them to have forfeited their Right to the Lands they hold of the Empire, the Emperor not being able of himſelf to turn them out of Poſſeſſion, if the Arms of *Spain* ſhould chance to be engaged any other way, ſo that that King could not be at liberty to put in Execution the Imperial Ban, as he uſually does, the Emperor might perhaps in that caſe enter into a League with the Republick, allowing it to retain to its ſelf the greateſt part of the confiſcated Territories. Likewiſe if the Emperor ſhould ever come to an open Rupture with the Church, and ſhould reſolve to diſpute his Right, it is not impoſſible but that, to prevail with the Republick to give him their Aſſiſtance, both in aſſerting his Right, and in preſerving it, he would oblige himſelf to give the Republick ſome ſhare of the Conqueſt. Except it be in this manner, 'tis to no purpoſe to hope that either the Emperor's Intereſt, or Inclination, will lead him to aſſiſt the Republick with his Forces.

That

That the Emperor may readily join with other Princes againſt the Republick, is but too evident from the Example of former Emperors, and from the Advantage to be reap'd from ſuch an Union. The Emperor *Maximilian*, after having received a great many Benefits from the Republick, made no ſcruple to enter into a League againſt it, with his own Rival *Lewis* XII. King of *France*, whom a little before, being provok'd by repeated Injuries, he had declar'd a Rebel to the Holy Empire; altho' that King laugh'd at his imaginary Juriſdiction. If the Emperor conſented to the aggrandizing of ſo powerful a Monarch, as that of *France*, who is frequently in War with *Italy*, and always ſuſpected by the greateſt part of the Princes thereof, it would be much leſs difficult at preſent to perſuade him to unite with any other Potentate, as with *Spain*, with the Pope, or with any of the inferior Princes of *Italy*. Nay, he would enter into League with them, not only in proſpect of getting ſome Territory to his Share of the Conqueſt, but even for the bare Profit of ready Money. I don't believe that the Emperor would ſo eaſily enter into a League with *France* at preſent, as the Emperor *Maximilian* did; becauſe the Empire

XVIII. *Whether the Emperor may enter into a League with other Princes againſt the Republick?*

Empire being now made a Partiſan, and as it were a Vaſſal of *Spain*, if it appear'd to be againſt the Intereſt of the *Spaniards* for the Emperor to enter into any ſuch Alliance with *France*, he would not ſuffer himſelf to be decoyed into it, neither by Promiſes, nor hopes. So that this doubt will be fully reſolv'd, when we come to conſider the State of *Spain*. But if *Spain* ſhould deſire a League againſt the Republick, the Emperor would not fail to go into it.

XXI. *Whether it is for the Intereſt of the Republick, that* France *enlarge its Dominions?*

I come now to enquire into the State of *France*. About fifty Years ago, it was not only the Intereſt, but the Duty of the Republick, to wiſh for, and contribute to the Greatneſs of *France*; becauſe it was grown ſo much an Enemy to it ſelf as to ſeek its own Deſtruction; and that flouriſhing Kingdom was then very near, either falling into a State of Vaſſalage to other Princes, or being diſmembred into many petty Kingdoms, which is the ſame thing as being entirely deſtroyed. The Succeſſion of *Henry* IV. to the Crown, who had his Title from Nature, and his Poſſeſſion from the Sword, not only reviv'd the flouriſhing Condition of that Kingdom, but added ſo much Strength and Vigour to it, that whereas formerly it had

moved

moved Compaſſion in every body, it came at laſt to raiſe Emulation and Envy in its Neighbours. And if the Stroke of a Knife, by the Hand of a vile Miſcreant, had not put a ſtop to the Career of the Projects, and Life of ſo great a King, it would have requir'd either a great deal of Force, or a great deal of Skill, to obviate and fruſtrate his vaſt Deſigns. The Count of *Fuentes* was wont to brag of his having Inſtruments, that would ſet thoſe a dancing who had no mind to it. *Henry* IV. boaſted of the ſame thing, but with much greater reaſon he us'd to ſay, that for that time the Neutrality of the Republick was not current Coin. If he had given full Scope to his ill founded Deſigns, half a World would have hardly been enough to ſatiate his Deſire. But there is no occaſion of being diſmayed at ſeeing the Billows of a raging Sea, which ſeems as if nothing leſs would ſatisfy it, than ſwallowing up the whole Earth; and yet we ſee that a little heap of Sand has Force enough to ſtop all its Fury. Death generally carries a Sithe which cuts off all fine Projects, let them be never ſo well laid. If *Henry* III. had brought to an end the Siege of *Paris*, which was reduced to the laſt Extremity; if

Philip

Philip II. had not had ſo often for his Enemies the Heavens, and the Sea, both *Africk* and *England* would have been now in Chains, and the City of *Paris* would have been reduced to a Village. In a word, the Fatality of humane Things is ſuch, that all great Projects are fruſtrated by ſome unknown Cauſe; and likewiſe every Power has its own Bounds, beyond which it cannot paſs. The Commonwealth of *Rome* had no greater Enemy than its own Greatneſs. The preſent Poſture of Affairs in *France* has quite turn'd the Tables; and altho' the Jealouſies againſt *France* are not quite ceas'd, yet it will have great Difficulty to preſerve it ſelf from decaying during the King's Minority. 'Tis true, the common People are grown wiſer, than to ſhed their Blood for gratifying the Ambition of Great Men, and the moſt ambitious among the Grandees are now grown old, live at their Eaſe, and ſo have no other Thought but to maintain themſelves in the Condition they are in. The Duke of *Mayenne*, who was Head of the Catholick League, is now well ſtricken in Years, and abounds with Wealth, and Governments; ſo that ſince he either knew not how to ſet about it, or was not willing to aſpire at the Crown,

Crown, in the time of the greateſt Troubles, when he wanted nothing but the bare Name of King; it would be to no purpoſe for him to entertain any Thoughts of it at preſent, now that the King is fully ſettled on the Throne, reſpected for the Memory of his Father, and beloved for his own perſonal Qualities. And in the State of a Subject, the Duke of *Mayenne* has no occaſion to wiſh for a better Fortune. The Duke of *Guiſe*, a Man of a moderate Temper, will be deſirous to ſee how long a Duke of *Guiſe* will be able to live by the Courſe of Nature. The *Conſtable*, who is farther advanced in Years than the others, is more deſirous of Life, and of Children, than of a greater Fortune. The Duke of *Mercury*, who formerly pretended to erect the Dutchy of *Britanny* into a Kingdom, by virtue of his Wife's Right, is now dead in *Hungary*. The Duke of *Epernon* applies himſelf more to the Study of Oeconomy, than of Politicks, or of War. *Monpenſier*, who has always been of the King's Party, will not now ſet up againſt him. The Marchioneſs of *Vernol* will now have none to back her in her Freaks, and ſhe will have a great deal to do, to prove her ſelf innocent of the King's Death. On

the other hand, the Prince of *Condé*, the firſt Prince of the Blood, a Youth of great Modeſty and Reſignation, has an Example before his Eyes, how his Father, Grand-Father, and Great Grand-Father, unfortunately periſh'd in thoſe Civil Wars. And he himſelf has already had Experience of the *Spaniſh* Parſimony in this his Retreat; ſo that if he be deſirous of a greater Fortune, he may find means to come at it in *France*, and that with the Queen's Conſent, who ſtudies, as the common Report goes, to quench the Fire with Oyl. The *Hugonots* are quite weary. The Duke of *Bouillon*, their Head, is ſufficiently ſatisfied with his Condition; and beſides, if he has a mind to continue ſtill a *Hugonot* in his Religion, there is no body will diſturb him. But thoſe Grandees make Religion always ſerve for a Pretext, as *Leſdiguieres* is ſaid to do ſtill. So that altho' no Troubles ſhould break out in the King's Minority, yet the Republick cannot at preſent expect any other Protection from that Kingdom, than by way of Mediation, and Interceſſion, as it happen'd when the Republick was under Sentence of Interdiction, and Cardinal *Joyeuſe* was ſent to *Rome* on that account. Our Judgment therefore will perhaps

perhaps be more certain with reſpect to this Kingdom, than the others; and that is, that it is impoſſible for *France* to grow powerful in a long time, and altho' that ſhould happen, yet the Republick will have no reaſon to be jealous of its Power, unleſs it riſe to an exceſſive degree, a thing which will at leaſt require half an Age to bring it about, if it happen even then.

XX. *What Pretence of Right, what Inclination, and Conveniency France may have to ſeize upon any of the Territories of the Republick?*

As to what pretence of Right, what Inclination, and Conveniency *France* may have to ſeize upon any of the Territories belonging to the Republick. There is the Inclination and Good will, which, I think, needs not to be doubted of; ſince Princes do always look upon one another with Wolves Eyes. But as to any pretence of Right, *France* has none at preſent, nor will it ever have any, till it firſt poſſeſs it ſelf of the State of *Milan*. The King of *France* has no Conveniency of attacking the Republick by himſelf, becauſe he cannot get at the *Venetian* Territories without paſſing over thoſe of other Princes, who readily will not grant him Paſſage for his Troops, for fear they be made the firſt Prey. So that the Conveniency which the King of *France* can have of a long time, can give no Jealouſie

to the Republick, which ought rather to wiſh for it, and facilitate it, than oppoſe it.

XXI. *What Pretence of Right, what Inclination, and Conveniency, the Republick has to ſeize upon any of the* French *Dominions?*

On the other hand, as matters are at preſent, the Republick neither has, nor can have any Claim againſt the Country of *France*; becauſe the King of *France* being wholly excluded out of *Italy*, even in that ſmall Portion he had of it, the Marquiſate of *Saluzzo*, for which he got in Exchange the Country of *Breſſe*, a Country much more profitable, but not ſo convenient for great Undertakings, the Republick has not the leaſt Pretext to graſp at any thing belonging to *France*. If there is no Pretence of Right, neither is there any Inclination, or Conveniency for the Republick to attack the Kingdom of *France*. For that Inclination which has no other Foundation, than barely a Deſire of the Increaſe of Dominion, being altogether unprofitable, has no great Power over the Senate of *Venice*,

XXII. *Whether* France *may probably enter into a League with the Repulick for conquering the Dominions of other Princes?*

An Alliance between *France* and the Republick, for conquering the Dominions of other Princes, will always be the moſt eaſie to be brought about, whenever *France* is in a condition for ſuch an Undertaking. The Examples of paſt Ages are a clear proof of this, as they are likewiſe of the Republick's

lick's having repented of ſuch an Alliance. Now that the *French* are excluded out of *Italy*, to get footing there they will promiſe to the Republick conſiderable Shares of the Kingdom of *Naples*, and Dutchy of *Milan*. But when they have once conquer'd all the reſt of the *Spaniſh* Territories in *Italy*, the Portions of them that are by the Treaty of Alliance allotted to the Republick, will be an Eye-ſore to the *French*; and then they will enter into a League with ſome other Prince againſt the Republick, to recover what they will call their own, and to increaſe their Dominions with a ſhare of what is not their own. Thus it happen'd with *Lewis* XII. who was the firſt that aſſented to the Confederacy of *Cambray*, upon the Promiſe of the Confederates to put him in Poſſeſſion of *Cremona*. And all the while he was treating with the Confederates, he deluded the Ambaſſadors of the Republick, with his ſolemn Proteſtations that he would never conclude any thing to its Prejudice, concealing thus the Treaty for the ſpace of forty Days after he had agreed to it. And then afterwards he proſecuted the War againſt the Republick in a moſt barbarous manner, cauſing even the Gover-

nours of the Places that were taken to be hanged.

XXIII. *Whether* France *may readily enter into a League with other Princes againſt the Republick?*

But ſhould other Princes deſire the Aſſiſtance of *France*, for invading the Territories of the Republick, even before the King of *France* were Maſter of *Milan*, let us ſee what, in all probability, would be the Conduct of *France* in this particular. If the Propoſal came from any other Prince beſides the King of *Spain*, there is no doubt but *France* would readily join with it, to have a footing in *Italy*. If it were the King of *Spain* that made the Propoſal, *France* ought certainly to oppoſe it, and not to contribute to the Greatneſs of his Rival. But he would lie under a great Temptation to embrace it, in hopes of getting ſome Portion of the Territories of the Republick, which would make him the King of *Spain*'s Neighbour in *Italy*. And a preſent Benefit has uſually greater Influence, than that which ſecures us from a remote Danger, the Diſtance making us flatter our ſelves with hopes of avoiding it. However, if ſuch an Alliance ſhould be concluded againſt the Republick, it would be neceſſary to ſtir up againſt *France* all the bad Humours of the Nation, or ſome Rival that is near to him, ſuch as *England*. The Friendſhip

ſhip likewiſe of the Duke of *Savoy*, if any Truſt could be put in him, would be very uſeful, in hindering the *French* from paſſing the Mountains, and making Inroads into *Dauphiny* and *Provence*. But theſe are things at ſuch a diſtance, that we may leave them to the Diſcretion of thoſe that ſhall be then alive, when the Meaſures to be taken muſt be adapted to the Poſture of Affairs at that time. For as the Times change, ſo likewiſe may the Affections, and he may perhaps be our Enemy at that time, who is now our beſt Friend and Ally. Thus much for *France*.

XXIV. *Whether it is for the Intereſt of the Republick that* Spain *enlarge its Dominions?*

Let us now turn our Thoughts a little to *Spain*, with reſpect to which Monarchy it will be no difficult Task to anſwer all the Queſtions propos'd concerning other States, it being an eaſie matter to diſcover the Intereſt of that Kingdom. The Family of *Auſtria* having, from being poor inconſiderable Counts of *Habsburg*, by Marriages ſucceeded to the Poſſeſſion of twelve Kingdoms, and of ſeveral Dutchies in *Europe*, beſides the Dominions they have in the *Indies*, lets us ſee what vaſt Fortune it has had in the World, and what Induſtry it has employed in acquiring ſuch large Dominions. So that if it is not ſtop'd

in its Fortune by the Fatality of Humane Things, it is in a fair way to arrive at the univerſal Monarchy. If *Charles* V. had had as much Prudence in his Youth, as he had when he was farther advanced in Years, he would not have divided the Empire from the Kingdoms of *Spain*, and would have procured his Son *Philip*, inſtead of *Ferdinand* his Brother, to be elected King of the *Romans*; in which caſe his Son could have reaſonably entertain'd Thoughts of being Univerſal Monarch. He try'd to perſuade *Ferdinand* to renounce, but to no purpoſe; that Prince being wiſer than to part with what had miraculouſly dropt into his Lap; and *Charles*, by making the Propoſal, forfeited the Character of Moderation he had in the World, and the Merit of the Love and Affection he had ſhewn towards his Brother. The Emperor *Charles* gave another Example of his Modeſty, but of which he likewiſe very ſoon repented; and that was his voluntary reſigning the Government, in his own Life-time, into the Hands of his Son *Philip*; who upon the Anniverſary of his Acceſſion to the Throne, when any of his Courtiers congratulated him upon an Event that was ſo unexpected, he was wont to make

make Anſwer, That they ought likewiſe at the ſame time to condole with him for his Father's Repentance. Whether this was true, or falſe, it is certain, that *Philip* was not willing to commend an Action which he had no mind to imitate. For moderate Affections in a Prince are only unnatural Caprices, or rather ephemerous Imaginations, which die the ſame Day they are born. The Greatneſs therefore of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy is to be ſuſpected; but then again this wild Beaſt has always two Hounds at her Heels, who purſue her cloſely, the *Turk* by Sea, and *France* by Land. Beſides, *Holland* ſerves as an Iſſue to *Spain*, which drains it ſufficiently of all its groſs and peccant Humours. But to ſpeak the Truth, the *Spaniards*, with all their Cunning, have for once fallen into the ſame Error with the Dog, who catching at the Shadow in the Water, loſt the Subſtance which he held in his Mouth. For forty Years ſucceſſively *France* had been ſufficiently kept under, being intangled in Civil Wars; and during that time *Spain* might have with much greater advantage negotiated a Truce with *Holland*, if it would have laid aſide thoſe Punctilio's of declaring the *Hollanders* to be a free Peo-

ple,

ple, which at laſt it was forced to yield to. The putting an end to the War in the *Low Countries* at that time, would have turn'd greatly to the advantage of *Spain*; ſince his Catholick Majeſty having no open War with the *Turk* after the Battel of *Santa Giuſtina*, would have been at liberty to imploy two thirds of his Force in making new Conqueſts in *Italy*. Here were at that time no other Forces but thoſe of the Country, of which the King of *Spain* had at leaſt one half for him, he being Sovereign of *Naples* and *Milan*; ſo that his Arms could not have met with any conſiderable Oppoſition. It is ſaid, that all the Princes of *Italy*, when they are united together, may be able to counter-ballance the Power of *Spain*. But what hopes is there, that ever the *Italian* Princes will enter cordially and ſincerely into ſuch an Union, which would be ſubject, if to no other Inconveniences, at leaſt to that of the Vacancy of the Holy See? So that altho' ſuch an Union may perhaps be poſſible in Nature, yet, being attended with ſuch innumerable Difficulties, it will never be brought about. It might have been alledg'd as a great proof of the good Intentions of *Philip*, that he never made

any

any Attempt towards the Univerſal Monarchy, if he had not ſufficiently declar'd to the World his deſire of Dominion, by pretending firſt the Union of the two Crowns, then by getting the *Infanta* of *Spain* made Queen of *France*, and afterwards by ſeizing upon ſeveral Places. From theſe Demonſtrations we may gather, that he was not ſo very moderate in his Temper, but that he has been croſs'd in his Deſigns; he having attempted firſt of all to ſeize upon the Body of the Tree, whereas it had been more expedient for him to have begun with the Branches. The *Italians* therefore have reaſon to be overjoyed, that half an Age of ſo great danger has paſt over their heads, without their being reduced to any greater Servitude. At preſent, during the Minority of the King of *France*, the Jealouſies againſt *Spain* may perhaps be renewed; but however *Spain* would have reaſon to be afraid, leſt either *France*, or *England*, ſhould imploy ſome powerful Motives for ſtirring up the *Hollanders* a-new againſt them, in which caſe the *Italians* would not fail to be aſſiſting with their Money. So that providing the *Italians* are only able to reſiſt the firſt Attacks of the *Spaniards*, they will

will have no reaſon to be afraid of them, ſince at preſent *France* can have no pretext for not coming to their aſſiſtance, but want of Will, whereas in former Times it wanted Force. But I hardly believe, that *Spain* will hazard the breaking of a Truce, which, after having ſpent much Blood and Treaſure in the War, it was forced to conclude to the great diſhonour and detriment of the Crown. I conclude this point with ſaying, that it is no ways expedient for the Republick, nor indeed for any other Prince, whether in *Italy*, or beyond the *Alps*, the Emperor alone excepted, that *Spain* ſhould increaſe in Power and Dominion; and the Republick ought to hinder the growth of that Monarchy by all ſecret means, and even to pull off the Mask, and oppoſe it openly, if there is occaſion.

XXV. *Whether* Spain *has any Pretence of Right, Inclination, or Conveniency, to ſeize upon any part of the Territories of the Republick?*

If it be ask'd, whether *Spain* has any Pretence of Right, Inclination, or Conveniency, to ſeize upon any part of the Territories of the Republick, it will be no hard matter to give an anſwer. The Pretenſions of the *Spaniard* would be to *Breſcia*, *Crema*, and *Bergamo*, antiently Members of the State of *Milan*, and ſo very conſiderable ones, that theſe three Cities would make a very conſiderable Dutchy,

chy, and perhaps next to *Milan*, the moſt powerful Dutchy in *Lombardy*, So that there is no reaſon to doubt of the *Spaniards* looking upon theſe Cities with an eye of Covetouſneſs, and of their having an Inclination to get them into their poſſeſſion. And this anſwers the Queſtion in two of its parts. The third part, which is always the moſt important, comes next to be conſider'd, and that is, the Conveniency the *Spaniards* have for recovering thoſe Places they claim a Right to. And here it will be neceſſary to diſtinguiſh. For the King of *Spain* will attack the Republick, either by himſelf alone, or united with ſome other Prince; and the Republick will defend it ſelf either barely with its own Force, or in conjunction with the Forces of ſome other Potentate. If the King of *Spain* alone aſſault the Republick, when it is united with any other Prince whatſoever, whether one whoſe Territories lie beyond the *Alps*, or in *Italy*, he will not find it an eaſy matter. For the plenty of Money which the Republick has, being join'd to the Troops of another Prince, will be able to put a ſtop to the Arms of the moſt powerful Prince, and particularly of *Spain*, who has Forces enough, but at a diſtance; and vaſt

vaſt Dominions, but lying ſcatter'd from one another. I mean however, when the Republick is united with any Prince that makes a tolerable Figure; for its Union with any of thoſe petty Dukes would be of no avail. Beſides, the Republick would be always able to create a Jealouſie in the King of *Spain*, leſt while his Arms were engaged in *Lombardy*, ſome Prince ſhould attack him in the Bowels of his own Dominions. If *Spain*, in conjunction with any other Prince whatſoever, ſhould attack the Republick, when it is united with *France*, inſtead of making Conqueſts upon its Neighbours, I believe it would have difficulty enough to maintain its own, becauſe the *French* would be able, in an inſtant, to pour in vaſt numbers of Men into *Lombardy*, when they have any powerful Prince of *Italy*, ſuch as the Republick, to receive them; and then the *Spaniard* being ſurrounded on one ſide by the *French*, and on the other by the *Venetians*, he might perhaps be in hazard of loſing the Dutchy of *Milan*. But if we conſider the Republick united with ſome *Italian* Prince, *France* ſtanding neutral, as might very readily happen in the Minority of the King, and that *Spain* has the aſſiſtance of the Pope, and Emperor,

Emperor, I'm afraid it would be a difficult thing for the Republick to defend itſelf, becauſe that other Prince, the Republick's Ally, could not be able to give it any great aſſiſtance. The fitteſt Ally the Republick could have among the *Italian* Princes, would be the Duke of *Savoy*; but he would be under a continual Temptation of being brib'd over to the other Party, and likewiſe his Alliance would coſt the Republick very dear. The richeſt Ally would be the Duke of *Florence*; but he lies at too great a diſtance from the Republick, ſo that I can hardly well tell what would be the event in caſe of an Alliance with him. If the King of *Spain* alone ſhould attack the Republick, while it is deſtitute of all foreign Succour, the War would be very dangerous to the Republick, if the King of *Spain* happen'd to be free of all manner of Jealouſy, from any of the Princes beyond the *Alps*, and the Event of the War could not well fail to prove fatal to the Republick, if it were carried on by Land. But ſhould the *Spaniards* attack the Republick by Sea, I'm confident the Republick would be proof againſt all their Naval Force.

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XXVI. *Whether the Republick has any Pretence of Right, Inclination, or Conveniency to ſeize upon any part of the Territories of* Spain?

As to the queſtion, whether the Republick has any Pretence of Right, Inclination, or Conveniency, to ſeize upon any part of the Territories of *Spain*, I anſwer; That the Pretenſions of the Republick would be to *Cremona* in *Lombardy*, and to *Monopoli*, *Trani*, and other Sea Ports of *Puglia*, both which Countries were under the Government of the Republick, before ever *Spain* claim'd any Right to them. So that if at that time the Republick ſet up its Pretenſions, and ſhew'd an Inclination to recover thoſe Places, theſe would not be wanting at preſent, if the Republick ſaw any Conveniency for making their Pretenſions effectual. There is only one caſe I can think of, which might give us ſome Grounds to hope, and that is, if the Republick were in Alliance with *France*, and the Emperor diverted by a War againſt the Proteſtants, ſo that *France* might aſſiſt us againſt the *Spaniard*, and the Emperor could not be at liberty to aſſiſt him againſt us; in that caſe, either all the Pretenſions of the Republick, or at leaſt a part of them, might be made effectual. But ſtill the Republick would be ſuſpicious, leſt its Allies ſhould at laſt join with its Enemies, to take from the Republick all it had gain'd

gain'd by the War, as happen'd at the League of *Cambray*.

This laſt Conſideration may ſerve as an Anſwer to the Queſtion, whether *Spain* may readily join with any other Prince, againſt the Republick. 'Tis true, I can hardly believe that, upon any account whatſoever, the King of *Spain* will attempt a League with *France* to invade the Territories of the Republick; becauſe *Spain* would receive more damage by letting the *French* remain Poſſeſſors of one only City in *Italy*, than it could expect to reap profit, ſhould it get all the remaining part of the Dominions of the Republick to itſelf. If *Spain* do not enter into a League with *France*, for recovering ſome part of its own Dominions which it has loſt, to be ſure it will never contract any ſuch Alliance, for conquering the Dominions of the Republick.

XXVII. *Whether* Spain *may probably join with any other Prince againſt the Republick?*

It is but in very few caſes we can expect that *Spain* will unite with the Republick, to make Conqueſts on other Princes. If an Alliance were propoſed, for conquering any of the Territories of an *Italian* Prince, *Spain* would never agree to it, becauſe it is the Intereſt of that Monarchy not to ſuffer the Republick to grow greater; and it is better for *Spain* that *Italy* be

XXVIII. *Whether* Spain *will readily unite with the Republick againſt other Princes?*

canton'd out into many ſmall States, than that it be united under one Power. Beſides, all the Princes of *Italy* are, as it were, Minors, under the Guardianſhip and Protection of *Spain*. If *Spain* were deſired by the Republick to enter into a League for ſeizing on any of the Territories of the Pope, to be ſure *Spain* would never conſent, but rather oppoſe it ſtrenuouſly; and would not fail to lay hold of this occaſion to have himſelf celebrated as Protector of the Church. If the *French* had made any Conqueſt in *Italy*, *Spain* would then readily enter into an Alliance with the Republick, and bear with its increaſing in Power, that it might thereby avoid the Emulation and Neighbourhood of *France*. However, notwithſtanding all the Suſpicions and Jealouſies we have of *Spain*, it cannot be denied but its Neighbourhood has hitherto been leſs uneaſy than that of others, even when the *Sforza*'s were Dukes of *Milan*. For altho' they had not Force enough to do any great damage to the Republick, yet what they wanted in Strength, they made up with cunning and clandeſtine Practices. *Spain* would readily enough join its Naval Force with that of the Republick to act in conjunction againſt the *Turk*; as it would likewiſe

likewiſe be ready to unite its Land Forces to thoſe of the Republick, were they to be jointly imployed againſt the *Griſons*, and their Neighbours the *Valeſans*. And this is all I have to ſay on the Head of *Spain*.

XXIX. *Whether it is for the advantage of the Republick, that the* Italian *Princes increaſe their Dominions?*

It is fit we conſider the State of the other *Italian* Princes, becauſe of their Neighbourhood. And I think it would be altogether for the Intereſt of the Republick, that theſe Princes increas'd in Power and Dominion, providing they could do it at the coſt of *Spain*, or even of the Church. But neither the one nor the other can they poſſibly do of themſelves, unleſs the World ſhould turn upſide down. The only way they can effectuate ſuch a thing, is by entring into an Alliance with *France*, and waiting till the *Spaniſh* Monarchy is tore in pieces. Then if any of the Spoil ſhould fall to the ſhare of theſe Princes, it would be ſo much the better for the Republick, becauſe the *French* would have the leſs Dominion in *Italy*. But ſhould one of theſe Princes ſeize upon the Territories of the other, it would be of no manner of advantage to the Republick, neither can I ſee any manner of good would follow from it; and then it would be a means to kindle

the Fire in *Italy*; a Property of which Element is to go on its Courſe without aiming at any one place, and it often dilates it ſelf to places, where they are leaſt afraid of it.

XXX. *Whether the Princes of Italy have any Pretenſions, Inclination, or Conveniency, to ſeize upon any of the Dominions of the Republick?*

It will not take up much of our time to conſider, whether the Princes of *Italy* have any Pretenſions, Inclination, or Conveniency, to ſeize upon any part of the Dominions of the Republick. The Duke of *Mantoua* has ſome Pretenſions to *Valleggio*, and *Peſchiera*. The Duke of *Modena* lays claim to the Country of *Eſte*, from whence he takes his Name, and his Origin. But altho' their Pretenſions were back'd with an Inclination to recover what they claim a Right to, yet there is no poſſibility of their ever having a Conveniency to make good their Claim, while they continue in the ſame condition they are in. For all the Princes of *Italy* united together, except the Pope, and the King of *Spain*, might well give Diſturbance to the Republick, but could never endanger it; becauſe the Territories of two of the moſt conſiderable Princes among them lie very much expos'd. The Duke of *Savoy* has ſome Places belonging to the Dutchy of *Milan* in the Heart of his Country;

Country; and the Duke of *Florence* has his Territories intermix'd with thoſe of the Church.

XXXI. *Whether the Republick has any Pretenſions, Inclination, or Conveniency, to ſeize upon any thing belonging to the Princes of* Italy?

The next thing to be enquir'd into, is whether the Republick has any Pretenſions, Inclination, or Conveniency, to ſeize upon any thing belonging to the Princes of *Italy* in the condition they are in. *Ferrara*, which belong'd to the Houſe of *Eſte*, not being in the Hands of the Republick, it has no manner of Pretence to *Modena*, or *Reggio*. The Republick may well be ſuppos'd to have an Inclination to *Mantoua*, it being a Gate that opens into the Bowels of the Dominions of the Republick; but, to ſpeak the truth, it has but very little Pretence to it, unleſs it ſhould take for a Pretence the Reimburſement of the Money which the Republick has ſpent in Defence of the Place. And it would ſtill find leſs Conveniency to ſeize upon a Place of this Importance, which would alarm other Princes, and the Dance would not readily end at him that began it. It is to no purpoſe to ſay any thing here of the other Princes of *Italy*, the Republick never having had any great Concern with them. And the *Genoeſes*, who formerly created ſo much Trouble to the Republick, have imi-

tated the Fable of the Horſe, who living in full Liberty, ſuffer'd himſelf to be bridled by Man, hoping thereby to triumph more eaſily over the other Animals. But *Genoua* has by this ſhift loſt its Liberty, and, ſince the War of *Cambray*, has not been able, nor is it likely to be in haſte, to do any great Damage to the Republick

XXXII. *Whether the Princes of* Italy *may readily enter into a League with the Republick againſt other Princes; or with other Princes againſt the Republick?*

There will be no great Difficulty to engage the Princes of *Italy* to enter into a League, either with the Republick againſt other Princes, or with other Princes againſt the Republick. Becauſe their Revenue being very inconſiderable for the Rank of Princes, they would not readily let ſlip any Occaſion of enlarging their Dominions, or filling their Coffers with ready Mony and Penſions. The Duke of *Florence* however would not be influenced by this Motive, becauſe he is in no want of Money, he being perhaps the richeſt Prince in Money of all Chriſtendom; and his Treaſure is always increaſing, becauſe thoſe Princes of *Florence* do ſtill retain their ancient Inclination to Trade, and Induſtry; which enriches the Prince without any Damage to the Subject. And perhaps it is of *Florence* alone

alone that we can ſay, that the Prince's Treaſury is not the Oppreſſion of the People. The Duke of *Florence* is a very conſiderable Prince, he being Sovereign of a Fertile Country, which lies compactly together, in the Heart of *Italy*, to which the Territories of other Princes ſerve as a Bulwark; ſo that he is put to very little Charges. This Prince is likewiſe to be reſpected, becauſe of the Juriſdiction he has at Sea, by the means of *Leghorn*, and by his Naval Force. So that if the Republick were under a Neceſſity of having recourſe to the Friendſhip of any of the *Italian* Princes, I do not know one among them whom we can more ſafely rely on than the Duke of *Florence*, he being free from that ſordid Temptation of being bribed with Money, and being a Prince who obſerves ſtill the Faith practis'd among Merchants. If the Republick have a mind to enter into a League with the other Princes of *Italy*, there will be no manner of Difficulty in it, providing the Republick ſupply them with Money to pay their Troops; for that they are not able to do themſelves. But the Obſervation made by *Boccalini* of the *Italian* Princes is very lively, when he ſays, that they had made it their choice

to obſerve the Precept of *Galateus*, That no body might impute it to them as Ill-breeding, to eat with both their Jaw-Bones.

XXXIII. *The Intereſt of the Republick with Reſpect to* Poland.

The Republick has no other Intereſt with the King of *Poland*, than their common Concern for the Chriſtian Religion. In Matters of State there is nothing to be expected from thence, unleſs it were to perſuade that King to make a Diverſion, when the Republick is engaged in a War with the Turk. And for that reaſon, it would be for the Intereſt of Religion, and of the Republick, that the King of *Poland* enlarged his Dominions. But he is cramp'd by the Tyranny of the Turks, and by having the Bowels of his own Country infected with Hereſie. The Kingdom of *Poland* lying at ſuch a Diſtance from *Italy*, there is no great Occaſion of making a ſtricter Enquiry into the Intereſt of that Crown. The Republick never had any other Concerns with the King of *Poland*, than mutual Compliments of Civility. And as the Hopes of the Republick's receiving any Benefit from thence are vaſtly diſtant, ſo there is no manner of fear of that King's being able to hurt us. It will be an eaſie Matter to cultivate a good Correſpondence with

with that Prince; and it has hitherto always ſucceeded, if not in Deeds, at leaſt in good Words, there being no common Intereſt between the two States to create any Miſunderſtanding.

XXXIV. *The Intereſt of the Republick with the Czar of* Muſcovy.

What I have ſaid of *Poland* may be apply'd to *Muſcovy*, although lying ſtill at a greater Diſtance from us. However, the great Duke of *Muſcovy* may be ſometimes engaged in War with the Turk, and for that Reaſon it will be convenient for the Republick to entertain a good Correſpondence with him in general, leaving all particular Buſineſs to be tranſacted in ſuch a manner as the Circumſtances of the Times will require.

XXXV. *The Intereſt the Republick has to keep up a good Correſpondence with the King of Great* Britain.

The King of *England*, who is the moſt conſiderable among the Princes that differ from the Church of *Rome*, is a Prince of great Power, and has large Territories; and his Dominions are now become ſo great by the Union of the three Kingdoms, of *England*, *Scotland*, and *Ireland*, in the Perſon of King *James*, that they cannot well be greater. The whole Iſland of *Britain*, which is the largeſt in our Hemiſphere, being now reduced to the Subjection of one Monarch, he has no more Land to conquer,

conquer, and he has the Sea for a Wall to his Dominions; ſo that if *England* does not deſtroy it ſelf with its own Hands, it may bid Defiance to all foreign Powers. We have an Inſtance of this in the fruitleſs Attempt that was made upon *England* by King *Philip* II. of *Spain*, when with his *Invincible Armada* he thought to lay *England* in Chains; but he loſt his Labour, and came off with Diſhonour in the Undertaking; and yet at that time *England* was not united to *Scotland*. The Channel is extreamly dangerous to paſs, and the Weather proving tempeſtuous, the greateſt part of the *Spaniſh* Fleet was ſtranded upon the Banks and Shallows along the Coaſt. Queen *Elizabeth*, who has given us a Proof how far Woman's Capacity is able to reach in State Affairs, did with her Fleet extend her Dominion, even to the Indies, and attack'd *Spain* in that remote Corner of the World. She likewiſe put Garriſons into ſome of the Sea-port Towns of *Holland*, and *Zeland*, to keep them as a Security for Sums lent to the States of thoſe Countries. So that it ſeem'd as if ſhe had not been contented with her own World; for the Iſland of *Britain* was always thought to be a diſtinct World from ours.

ours. It is an Iſland that abounds with all things neceſſary for human Life, although the Inhabitants go in queſt of many things from other Countries to gratifie their Luxury, and among theſe are Raiſins, and Currans, which they fetch from the Levant. In the time of *Henry* VIII, who was the King that apoſtatiz'd from the Church of *Rome*, it was uſual for the Kings of *England* to concern themſelves with the Affairs of *Italy*; and many times the Popes, for whom the ancient Kings of *England* had always a great Veneration, and even voluntarily liſted themſelves their Vaſſals, received great Protection from them, when they interpoſed their Mediation, and ſometimes Threats to other Princes in their Favour, and that always to very good purpoſe. It is certain, the Catholick Religion has ſuffer'd a great Loſs by having ſo powerful a Monarch withdrawn from its Communion, and the Court of *Rome* has loſt in him a great Protector. I do not know whether to impute it to the laſcivious Temper of *Henry* VIII, or to the want of Conſideration in *Clement* VII. At preſent the King of *England* will not bear to hear talk of *Rome*, and he ſeems to be very little curious

curious about the Affairs of *Italy*, from which he is ſeparated by ſuch a tract of Sea. If this Monarch did increaſe in Power and Dominion, it would be much for the Intereſt of the Republick; becauſe it might procure his Alliance, and by that means encreaſe the Reſpect of other Princes towards the Republick. But altho' he ſhould not grow more powerful than he is, yet Pains ought to be taken to cultivate his Friendſhip; becauſe that King having an ancient Antipathy againſt the *French*, and a late Quarrel with *Spain*, both one and t'other of theſe Diſpoſitions are the moſt favourable that can happen for the Republick. 'Tis true, the preſent King ſhews a greater Inclination to fight with Arguments againſt the Catholicks, than with Arms againſt Princes; and this is his particular Genius, he valuing himſelf upon being an able Divine. So ſtrong is the Prejudice of that Country againſt *Rome*, that the King himſelf ſtudies to be a Preacher. However, I do not think the Republick ought to take heed of theſe things, but ought to ſtrive by all means to preſerve that King's Friendſhip. For wherever there is Force, which is a matter that does not depend on the

Will

Will of the Prince, there is always hopes of getting it employed for our Advantage, which is a point that depends upon influencing the Paſſions. The means of preſerving a good Underſtanding with *England*, will be to continue the mutual Embaſſies between both States, and to give ſtrict Orders that the *Engliſh* Merchants in the Levant be well treated. But above all, the Republick ought, on every Occaſion, to ſhew itſelf to be a religious Obſerver of its Word; becauſe there is no Nation in the World that is a ſtricter Obſerver of the publick Faith than the *Engliſh*. And the Kings of Great *Britain* have not as yet learn'd this modern Leſſon of Politicks; *That it is no Diſhonour to lye for a Crown.*

XXXVI. *The Intereſt of the Republick to cultivate a Friendſhip with the* Hollanders.

It is greatly for the Intereſt of the Republick, to cultivate a ſtrict Friendſhip with the Seven united Provinces of the *Netherlands*; and it would not be amiſs if the Republick enter'd into a Defenſive League with them, eſpecially at preſent when they are in Truce with *Spain*. Such a League as this would ſerve as a Bridle to *Spain*, in caſe it ſhould attempt any thing againſt the Republick; and they would conſider well of it, before they laid open anew the Wounds

Wounds in the Low-Countries, which are not as yet cloſed up, and for which they have not Salve enough to apply to them. However, they have found means, if not to cure their Wounds, yet at leaſt to bind them well up for ſome time. The Republick may likewiſe try to procure a greater Commerce with the *Hollanders* in Matters of Trade; for they are eager Purſuers of Merchandize, and run wherever they ſee a Proſpect of Gain. Beſides, the *Hollanders* knowing that a Political Intereſt obliges this Republick to be jealous of the ſame Power, which they are afaid of, it will be no difficult Matter to unite the Wills of the two States, becauſe they are already united in Condition, they being both of them Commonwealths. And they have already given ſufficient Earneſt of their Eſteem, and good Will, by an Embaſſie of Compliment which they ſent to the Republick. Beſides the Advantage of getting the *Hollanders* to make a Diverſion againſt *Spain*, the Republick might likewiſe have from thoſe Countries, on all Occaſions, a conſiderable Squadron of Men of War with great Expedition. And now that their Country is inur'd to War, it would not be amiſs if the Republick

lick levied among them ſome Regiments of Foot, if the Circumſtances of the time when the Republick ſtands in need of them will allow of it. But in this Matter the Republick is to judge at the time, what will ſuit moſt with its Conveniency, when it will ſtand as much in need of good Troops, as of good Money.

XXXVII. *The Intereſt of the Republick with the Proteſtant Princes of* Germany.

The Republick has no political Intereſts to adjuſt with the heretical Princes of *Germany*, neither can it have any Differences with them in the preſent poſture of Affairs. If it is not well for Religion that theſe Princes increaſe in Power, yet, upon a politick Account, it happens very well that they are already ſo powerful as they are. Becauſe they keep the Empire in awe, which otherwiſe would be a Power formidable to all the Princes of *Europe*, but more to the Princes of *Italy* than to others, and moſt of all to the Republick of *Venice*. So that by the means of theſe Proteſtant Princes, the Empire is kept in an even Ballance, and its Hands are, as it were, tied up for the publick Good. With theſe Princes the Republick will always have a good Underſtanding, both becauſe they know that the Republick does not

not pay a blind Adoration to the Intereſts of the Court of *Rome*, and likewiſe becauſe they ſee the Jealouſies that are between the Emperor and the Republick, from which they conclude there can be no ſincere Alliance between the Emperor and us. So that as theſe *German* Princes will have no diffidence in the Republick, they will likewiſe be convinced that the Republick confides in them. As Occaſion offers, it will be fit that the Republick give them Demonſtrations of their good Will towards them, that, in caſe the State of Affairs ſhould require it, the Republick may the more eaſily engage them to make a Diverſion, and to allow it to levy Soldiers in their Country; which is a Matter of high Concern to the Republick, to provide in time where it may be ſupplied with Troops in caſe of Need; for in *Italy* it will get very few, and thoſe none of the beſt.

XXXVIII. *The Republick's Intereſt with the Electors of* Bavaria, *and* Palatine.

I have not as yet mentioned the Duke of *Bavaria*, nor ſhall I ſay any thing of him, he being ſo intirely devoted to the Emperor, who has honour'd him with an Electoral Vote, to the Excluſion of the Elector *Palatine*; and this bare Reflection is enough with Reſpect to theſe two Princes.

Princes. [b] Beſides, the Duke of *Bavaria* is ſo high in his Pretenſions, that he had the Boldneſs to claim the Precedency of the Republick at the Council; for which Reaſon, I cannot ſay that there will ever be a good Underſtanding between the Republick and this Duke. So that if time ſhould happen to bring down this Prince a little lower, I believe it would not be ungrateful to the Republick; becauſe it is always convenient, that he who has no good Inclinations, ſhould never have many good Troops.

XXXIX. *The Republick's Intereſt with the Knights of* Malta.

The Knights of *Malta*, who are always employed in cruiſing along theſe Seas, are not riſen to any conſiderable pitch of Greatneſs; wherefore they watch the more narrowly over the Motions of the *Ottoman* Port, while it is aſleep. The Friendſhip of theſe Knights can be of no

[b] In the preſent Poſture of Affairs, the Diſpoſitions of theſe two Electors are quite contrary to what they were in Father *Paul*'s time; the Houſe of *Bavaria* being imbark'd in an Intereſt directly oppoſite to the Emperor; and the Elector *Palatine* being now wholly devoted to the Houſe of *Auſtria*. By which Adherence he hopes to recover the Dominions, and Privileges, that were taken from his Anceſtors, and given to the Duke of *Bavaria*.

great Advantage to the Republick except in a War with the Turk; in which Caſe it will be no hard Matter to bring them into an Alliance; to which they will be eaſily perſuaded by the Hopes of getting a Booty.

XL. *Whether it is for the Intereſt of the Republick, that the Emperor of the* Turks *encreaſe his Dominions?*

It remains now that I ſay ſomething concerning the greateſt Prince of the World, at leaſt of that World which is known to us, whoſe Power is terrible to all, but more eſpecially to the Republick, I mean the *Turk*. But although he is a Prince of ſo great Power, and one with whom we have ſo near Concerns, yet we know leſs of him than of other Princes. With Reſpect to him, all our Politicks are of no avail to us, our Art ſerves us to no purpoſe; he enters into Leagues with no Body, nor does he keep conſtant Ambaſſadors in any Place. In a Word, he values himſelf upon his ſlighting to make Enquiry into the Concerns of other Princes; he is like the Elephant, who, becauſe of his own extraordinary Strength, is jealous of no other Animal. But it is likely this is a cunning of the *Alcoran*, leſt their Ambaſſadors, by reſiding long in foreign Countries, ſhould imbibe new Cuſtoms, or refine

fine their Wits in Politicks, which is a thing the *Alcoran* would have all its Followers to be entirely ignorant of. This Empire is built on the Ruin of others. The Prince does not pretend to juſtifie his Poſſeſſion by a Claim of Right; all his Juſtice is founded upon Force. If he has Conveniency to conquer a Country, that's all the Right to it he cares for. And when he has got Poſſeſſion of a Kingdom, he lays Claim to all the Dependencies of it; and he ſuffers no Uſurpation upon what he himſelf has uſurp'd. Under the Government of the *Turks* every one makes Profeſſion of Ignorance, and it is not lawful for the Subjects to enquire into any thing. It is enough for them, that they learn a blind Obedience; if they know that they are Slaves, and what the Duty of Slavery is, then they are learned enough. They are not however ſo ignorant, but they can diſpute in Favour of their Sovereign's Claim to the Univerſal Monarchy, as we have ſeen in their Pretenſions to all the Dominions of *Conſtantine* the Great. Neither do they admit of the Diviſion of the Empire into *Eaſtern* and *Weſtern*, which was agreed on be-

tween *Nicephorus* and *Charles* the Great; and much leſs do they allow of any Donation of Territories to the Prejudice of the Empire. The Emperor of the *Turks* ſhews but very little Devotion to his own Religion. The *Muſti*, who is their High Prieſt, is obliged to ſpeak of Matters of Religion with great Deference to the Will of his Sovereign, and to declare the Law conformably to the Intention, and Service of the reigning Prince, otherwiſe his Contumacy coſts him his Life. He ſets no value on any of the Qualities of the Mind; practical and ſpeculative Virtues are unknown to him, nay even ſuſpected by him, and for that Reaſon he baniſh'd the Ambaſſadors that were ſent him by *Francis* I. King of *France*, becauſe with the Sweetneſs of their Harmony, they ſoften'd the Hardneſs of thoſe Hearts of Flint. He makes great account of Strength of Body, and of the Art of War; he commits great Barbarities on his Subjects. The Princes who are in greateſt vogue in that Country, are they who are of the moſt immoderate and brutal Temper. That Eaſtern Monarch is wholly intent on ſubduing the remaining part of the World.

World. He has an infinite Number of Troops, and an inexhauſtible Treaſure, his yearly Revenue amounting to above twenty Millions of Crowns. And beſides, he is Heir to all his Subjects that die worth any thing; for the Quality of a Slave leaves nothing to the Children, except the Arms, and a Horſe. Notwithſtanding all this Treaſure, he is ſtill thirſting after more Wealth, ſo that ſometimes the Storm of his Fury is appeas'd by a golden Shower. From what I have ſaid it plainly appears, that the Growth of the *Ottoman* Power would be pernicious to all other Princes, and that it would be a great Happineſs for them to ſee it leſſen'd. But the Hopes of this is at a great Diſtance, and in a manner impoſſible.

XLI. *Whether the* Turk *has any Pretence of Right, Inclination, or Conveniency to ſeize upon any of the Dominions of the Republick?*

The Emperor of the *Turks* has no manner of Pretence of Right to any part of the Territories of the Republick; but for Conveniency, and Inclination to ſeize upon them, theſe are not wanting to him. For the great thing he aims at, is the total Deſtruction of Chriſtendom. And his Force is no way unequal to the Greatneſs of his Deſign, conſidering that Chriſtendom is divided in itſelf,

and more taken up with inteſtine Feuds and Quarrels, than with the Thoughts of ſecuring itſelf againſt the Oppreſſion of Strangers. The *Turk* dreads nothing more than a general Union among all the Chriſtian Princes. And that he may not be negligent of his own Security, that wicked and cunning *Mahomet* has left him a Prophecy, that ſuch an Union will happen ſome time or other, to the Deſtruction of his Monarchy. This Propheſy they never call to Mind without great Howlings and Lamentations; and therefore, to prevent the Accompliſhment of it, the *Turk* labours all he can to put himſelf into ſuch a Poſture, as to be able to bid Defiance to all humane Power, ſhewing thereby how little he knows of the Force of Religion; for were the Propheſy true, no humane means could hinder the Accompliſhment of it. The *Turk* therefore has no Pretence of Right to any of the Dominions of the Republick, and never had any; but he neither wants Inclination, nor Conveniency to ſeize upon them. If it be ask'd what Conveniency he has; I anſwer, He is the neareſt Neighbour we have, and his Territories joyn ſo cloſely

to

to thoſe of the Republick, that they ſeem all to belong to one and the ſame Prince.

XLII. *What Pretenſions, Inclination, or Conveniency, the Republick has to ſeize upon any of the* Turkiſh *Dominions?*

On the other Hand, the Republick would have againſt the *Turk*, what he has not againſt the Republick; that is, a good Right to make a Conqueſt of part of his Dominions, which would not be properly a Conqueſt, but a Recovery of thoſe Places which he has uſurp'd from the Republick, and which would make a very conſiderable Prince. They are *Negropont*, *Modon*, *Coron*, *Caramania*, the *Archipelago*, *Tenedo*, *Boſnia*, *Scutari*, *Albania*, part of the Imperial City of *Conſtantinople*, and in a Word, little leſs than the half of the Country of *Romania*, as alſo *Cyprus*. If the *Turk* had not robbed the Republick, it would have been advanced to ſuch a pitch of Greatneſs, as that it would have been very little inferior to the Commonwealth of *Rome*. And this will clearly appear to any one that caſts his Eyes on the vaſt Territories which the *Turk* has uſurp'd from the Republick at ſeveral times. The Republick therefore has very good Pretenſions, and wants not likewiſe Inclination, but has no manner of Conveniency for recover-

ing its Right. So that it has Occaſion for an Oſtriche's Stomach, to be able to digeſt ſo hard a Morſel; but it is fit that it content itſelf with its preſent Loſs, leſt it ſhould endanger the reſt.

XLIII. *Whether the* Turk *will joyn in Confederacy with other Princes againſt the Republick?*

There is one Inconvenience which the Republick is not expoſed to with the *Turk*, and that is, that he will not enter into a Confederacy with other Princes againſt the Republick, becauſe he never confederates with any one. 'Tis true, that in the time of *Lewis Sforza*, the *Turk* was ſuborn'd by him to invade the Territories of the Republick, and long before that likewiſe by *Viſconti*, he having promis'd to hold in play the half of the Republick's Forces in *Italy*. It is ſaid alſo, that *Lewis* XII. King of *France* did not fail to ſolicite the *Turk*'s Aſſiſtance, when he aſſaulted the Republick by Virtue of the League of *Cambray*. But all theſe are not properly Alliances; they are only, as it were, Spurs to a Horſe that runs of himſelf.

XLIV. *Whether the* Turk *will joyn with the Republick to make Conqueſts on other Princes?*

The *Turk* would make no Difficulty to joyn with the Republick in making Conqueſts on other Princes, whenever the Republick pleas'd to deſire it; but it muſt reſolve to yield

up

up all the Conqueſt to the *Turk*, he knowing no other Partnerſhip but that of the Lyon in the Fable, to keep all the Prey to himſelf, and to leave nothing to his Partners. So that it would be Folly in the Republick to ſpend their Treaſure and Blood in increaſing the *Ottoman* Power, ſince it is already ſo great as to threaten Ruin to all other Princes. Without the Formality of entring into a League, the *Turk* would always be ready to aſſiſt the Republick with his Forces, in caſe it were attack'd by any other Prince; and this he has offer'd many times in the former Wars. But our wiſe Anceſtors of thoſe Days knew well enough, that they run a greater Hazard from their *Ottoman* Protector, than from their Chriſtian Enemy, not ſo much becauſe of the Exorbitancy of his Power, as for his want of Sincerity. So that the Republick always declin'd the Offer, and yet nevertheleſs the *Turk* to convince the *Venetians* of the Friendſhip he had for their State, did not lay hold of thoſe Opportunities to declare War againſt them, but on the contrary made the Republick a Preſent of Salt-peter, of which it ſtood greatly in need.

The

XLV. *The Republick ought to cultivate a Friendſhip with the* Turk; *but to conſider him ſtill as one that may be ſoon its Enemy.*

The only Policy that can be uſed with this Eaſtern Emperor, is for the Republick to make great Profeſſions of Friendſhip to him, but ſtill to make account that we may have him ſoon for our Enemy; and therefore to be always ſo well upon our Guard, as that our Weakneſs may not encourage the natural Rapacity of the *Turks*. The Peace with them will be always more laſting, when we have Forces enough ready to make War; and a good Correſpondence with them will be maintain'd more by Fear, than by Love. In caſe of a Rupture with them, the Republick might try to get a Diverſion made in its Favour, by the *Perſians* bordering on the Eaſt-ſide of the *Turkiſh* Dominions, and by the *Muſcovites*, and *Polanders* to the Weſtward. But this is a Buſineſs that would require time to negotiate it, and the Republick muſt in the mean while be engaged in War, ſo that it could expect to reap no great Benefit by ſuch a Breach. To corrupt the Miniſters after that the War is declared, is a thing that would not be very practicable; they would be more eaſily brib'd in time of Peace. And an Attempt of this Nature would be very ſeaſonable,

ſeaſonable, for penetrating into the Counſels, and retarding the Deliberations of that Court; providing that the Perſon who is gain'd over be a Man of Credit, and one of the *Baſhaws* of the Port, who have a deliberative Voice in the *Divan*, and more eſpecially the *Viſire*. But it happens oftentimes that theſe great Men take the Bribes, and then fail in performing what they undertook. Beſides, they are liable to conſtant Changes, from the Capricio's of the Emperor, and from the Calumnies of their Rivals. The Friendſhip of the Queen-Mother, of the Queen-Regent, and of the *Mufti*, may be of great Advantage to us. But all the Intereſt we can make with the Favourites of the Court will be of no avail to us, if the Prince that is upon the Throne be a Man of a reſolute Temper. For theſe Princes are ſo abſolute in their Command, and confide ſo much in their own Force, that they often begin a War without any other Motive than ſome ſudden Freak; and all ſuch tumultuary Deliberations are greatly applauded by the *Janizaries*, who are the Soul of that Empire. So that as I ſaid at firſt, a Political Prudence can avail us but little with this

this Eaſtern Monarchy; which is founded upon Fury, ſtands intirely upon its own bottom, without any coherence with other States, and will not ſo much as be guided by Reaſon.

XLVI. *The Concluſion.* I have nothing farther to ſay, than what the Angel ſaid to *Gideon*, *Be ſtrong, and of good Courage.* So concluding with my hearty Wiſhes for the Proſperity, and long Duration of the Republick, I think I have ſatisfy'd your Excellencies Commands, if not in full Diſcharge of my Duty, yet at leaſt in Proportion to my Talent.

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